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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on the Consumer Demand for and Optimal Pricing of State Lottery Games.        
(May 2012) 
Michael Alan Trousdale, B.A., Brigham Young University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Richard Dunn 
 
 
This dissertation is a collection of three economic studies on the demand for and 
optimal pricing of state lottery games.  Lottery betting is a multi-billion dollar industry 
that provides an important source of government revenue.  Since lotteries operate at such 
a large scale, suboptimal pricing could lead to substantial losses in potential profit.  This 
body of work provides a significant contribution to the literature on lottery demand by 
introducing a number of innovative modeling techniques that resolve major 
shortcomings found in current methods and provide direct policy implications for 
improving the profitability of state lottery games. 
The first essay discusses and resolves three important issues widely overlooked 
in the literature on lottery demand:  the treatment of observations with super-unitary 
expected values, controlling for the endogeneity of price, and the usefulness of 
estimating price elasticities evaluated at the sample mean.  Results indicate that data 
censoring presents a greater estimation bias than the endogeneity of the effective price.  
The second essay extends the effective price model of lottery demand into a setting 
where a single controller operates a portfolio of games simultaneously.  Expenditure, 
 iv 
own-, and cross-price elasticities for several on-line lottery games are estimated with a 
Barten synthetic demand system.  The elasticity estimates indicate that Texas Lottery 
games are largely economic substitutes and portfolio profits are not maximized at 
current prices. Finally, the third essay describes a new method to analyze the 
profitability of different pricing schemes that explicitly accounts for the intertemporal 
nature of lottery games with rolling jackpots.  Since period-by-period variation in sales 
induced by rolling jackpots causes changes in the probability that a jackpot is won, 
which in-turn influences the probability of reaching new drawings with higher jackpot 
amounts, static analysis of lottery profitability could lead to biased estimates of expected 
profit.   By utilizing a Monte Carlo integration procedure, a measure of expected profit is 
obtained through the simulation of lottery play over a period of four years. Hypothetical 
policy changes are examined to estimate potential increases in profitability.  Empirical 
results for the game, Lotto Texas, indicate that a $0.40 increase in price would lead to an 
estimated increase in profit ranging from $142 million to $191 million over four years.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION
1
 
Lottery betting is the most widely available form of legalized gambling in the 
United States. Available in all but seven states, it provides a significant source of 
government revenue, totaling over $53 billion nationwide in 2009 (La Fleur 2010).  In 
response to budget shortfalls during the recent recession, interest in lotteries as revenue 
generators has increased with several states adding new games to their portfolios.  Given 
their scale, even small improvements in the design and pricing of new and existing 
games could have a substantial impact on government revenue.  In addition, lotteries 
represent the purest form of a risky good.  As a result, studying the economics of lottery 
betting can provide greater insight into the demand for goods with stochastic payouts 
such as insurance and financial instruments. 
Historically, the analysis of demand for lottery games has been conducted 
primarily within a framework known as the Effective Price Model (EPM), which 
attempts to model the variation in ticket sales over time in response to changes in the 
implicit cost of a ticket induced by rolling jackpots.  The implicit, or effective, price 
combines the nominal ticket price (a fixed, certain cost) with a measure of the expected 
prize return (an uncertain benefit) in order to quantify the value of placing a bet for a 
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particular drawing.  This method provides a way to obtain a variable price measure in a 
market where nominal prices are fixed. 
While the EPM has been an important tool for economists to evaluate the 
profitability of lottery games, a number of methodological limitations still exist.  The 
aim of this dissertation is threefold, with each section building upon the previous. In the 
first essay, I address a number of important issues that have been overlooked within the 
current body of literature regarding the empirical estimation of a single game’s demand 
relationship under the effective price model.  Specifically, these issues include the 
treatment of negatively-defined effective prices, the endogeneity of the effective price, 
and the validity of summarizing price sensitivity using a single weighted-average price 
elasticity.  Improper treatment of these issues could potentially lead to substantially 
biased estimates in the price elasticity of demand of a lottery game, as well as improper 
implications on policies aimed at improving a target game’s overall profitability. 
The second essay extends this analysis to a setting where a single lottery operator 
manages a portfolio of concurrent games.  In the market for lottery gambling, states have 
moved toward operating multiple games, either by adding new games or joining multi-
state coalitions. While many studies have analyzed the demand for single games in 
isolation, relatively few have modeled the relationship between closely competing games 
within a portfolio.  To accomplish this task, I incorporate the use of a formal demand 
system, which provides three major advantages over previous approaches: (1) it is 
consistent with the theory of utility maximization; (2) it allows estimation of both 
compensated and uncompensated own- and cross-price elasticities; (3) it provides 
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parameter identification for games that exhibit no variation in the effective price.  
Ultimately, this model integrates the study of goods with stochastic utility (lottery 
games) with methods more commonly used to examine the demand for traditional 
consumer products. 
In the final essay, I develop a new method to analyze the profitability of different 
pricing schemes that explicitly accounts for the intertemporal nature of lottery games 
with rolling jackpots.  Previous work treats the profit maximization problem of the 
lottery controller in a static framework so that changes in price only influence 
profitability through the effect on period-by-period sales and expected payouts.  This 
situation neglects, however, that changes in the probability that a jackpot is won 
influences the probability of reaching new drawings with higher jackpot amounts.  Thus, 
while there is little cost in viewing lotteries as repeated static games from the perspective 
of players, the problem of profit maximization is clearly connected intertemporally 
because of rollovers. Intuitively, the more the jackpot is rolled over, the higher the ticket 
sales, but the more the resulting payouts will be when the jackpot is eventually claimed.  
Because this issue cannot be directly addressed in a static framework, I utilize a Monte 
Carlo integration procedure to obtain a measure of expected profit through the 
simulation of lottery play over a period of four years.  Such a procedure also provides a 
way to examine the effects of hypothetical changes in a game’s pricing on total profits 
earned by the lottery controller. 
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1.2  BACKGROUND ON LOTTERIES 
Modern lottery games can be classified into two major categories: off-line and 
on-line, both of which are typically offered within a state’s game portfolio.  Off-line 
games, such as scratch-offs or pull-tabs, are games that do not require the use of a 
computer terminal for purchase.  The tickets for a particular off-line game are printed in 
a fixed quantity with a duration lasting only as long as there are still tickets to be sold.  
These games reveal instantly to the player whether they have won a prize and are 
relatively simple in design, offering a predetermined number of winning tickets.  On-line 
games require the use of a computer terminal to access a network, through which the 
player’s bets are recorded.  Although these games come in various forms (e.g. lotto, 
bingo, keno, and other numbers games), they generally involve having a player select a 
small group of numbers from a larger set and are awarded prizes based upon how well 
their selection matches up with a randomly drawn result. 
Forty-three states as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the US 
Virgin Islands operate lotteries.  The operation of lotteries by individual states in the 
United States dates back only to the early 1960’s, but grew substantially over the next 
three decades, peaking in the late 1980’s with two-thirds of the nation’s population 
residing in states actively promoting the sale of lottery tickets (Clotfelter and Cook 
1989).  Following the economic recession of 2008, interest in lotteries has increased as 
states seek additional revenue sources. This trend is evident in FIGURE 1.1, which 
depicts the number of states participating in the two major multi-state lotteries in the 
United States, Powerball and Mega Millions. 
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FIGURE 1.1. The Number of States Participating in Multi-State Lotteries by Year 
 
 
 
TABLE 1.1. Allocation of State Lottery Proceeds 
 
Public Service No. of States 
Public & Higher Education 36 
Health & Human Services 12 
General Government 11 
Environmental Control 10 
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Although lottery games serve as a form of entertainment, they are established 
first and foremost as a source of revenue for the jurisdictions that operate them.  
Depending on the state, revenues collected from the sales of lottery tickets are used to 
fund a variety of public programs.  TABLE 1.1 summarizes general classifications of 
such programs along with the number of states that allocate lottery funds toward each.  
According to the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, annual lottery revenues amount 
to approximately 2% of total taxes in Texas (over $1.5 billion), which is more than the 
revenue collected from individual taxes on cigarettes, alcohol, and several other major 
goods and services. 
Although the Texas Lottery purveys both on-line and off-line games, this paper 
focuses solely on the analysis of the state’s portfolio of on-line lottery games.  The 
period-by-period rolling jackpots and pari-mutuel prize payouts of on-line games 
provide the price variation necessary for econometric identification.  Off-line games do 
not exhibit such characteristics and cannot be modeled within the framework discussed 
in this body of work. 
 
1.3  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the economic literature of demand for lottery gambling was developed 
following the explosive growth in this form of public financing throughout the United 
States in the late 1980’s.  Cook and Clotfelter (1993) were among the first to estimate the 
demand for lottery in this period, pioneering the Effective Price Model (EPM).  Their 
method attempts to explain how purchases of lottery tickets vary in response to changes 
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in the expected value of a bet, where the expected value is a function of both a period’s 
ticket sales and the probability of winning.  Although an effective price is not explicitly 
defined, the authors develop a time-series model of demand for lotto in Massachusetts, 
specifically targeting the association between sales and the game’s jackpot, while also 
controlling for rollovers and the expected value.  They compute the elasticity of sales 
with respect to the jackpot to examine whether there are advantages to increasing the 
scale of a lotto game, possibly through multi-state consortia.  
Building upon this idea, Gulley and Scott (1993) develop a similar model but 
argue that it is appropriate to define an effective price of a lottery bet.  The authors 
define the effective price of a ticket to be the nominal price ($1) minus the expected 
value, which exhibits an inverse relationship with the number of tickets sold.  Since the 
true expected value of a pari-mutuel bet is a function of total sales, which can only be 
determined once all bets have been taken, a proxy variable must be used to approximate 
players’ ex ante expectations of total sales. They estimate their model using a two-stage 
method where the effective price is first regressed on a time trend as well as the jackpots 
and rollover amounts of competing games in order to obtain an ex ante effective price.  
In the second-stage, log sales are regressed on the ex ante log of effective price, with the 
price coefficient interpreted as the price elasticity of demand evaluated at the sample 
mean.  For the four lotto-style games analyzed, the author’s model provides elasticities 
of -1.15, -1.92, -1.20, and -0.19, respectively, leading them to conclude that given the 
theoretical revenue maximizing average elasticity of -1.19 (which takes administrative 
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costs and sales commissions into consideration), two of the games are not priced 
optimally.   
A number of papers have built upon this model by adding different controls or 
applying it to analyze different lotteries.  For example,  Farrell, Morgenroth, and Walker 
(1999), and Farrell and Walker (1999) both analyze the UK National Lottery (UKNL) 
using a variant of the effective-price model (controlling for myopic addiction) to 
estimate price elasticities, with the latter continuing the line of research by using these 
elasticity estimates to evaluate the welfare effects of introducing a lottery.  The price 
elasticity they compute for the UKNL is -1.51.  Forrest, Gulley, and Simmons (2000) 
also examine the UKNL lottery using an effective-price model very similar to Gulley 
and Scott (1993), with an effective price defined as the expected loss (or one minus the 
expected value) and a log-log regression specification of sales on price.  They estimate 
both short- and long-run price elasticities for the UKNL’s first three years of operation 
and report these values to be -0.66 and -1.03, respectively. 
Farrell, Hartley, Lanot, and Walker (2000) analyze UKNL data to determine 
whether players choose their numbers uniformly and incorporate this information into a 
model to measure the game’s price elasticity.  They find that their data exhibit more 
rollovers than expected given the structure of the game’s rules, providing evidence that 
individuals do not choose their numbers uniformly.  They show that numbers above 31 
tend to be less popular, presumably since it is common for players to rely upon 
important dates such as birthdays or anniversaries to select their numbers.  
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 While these papers focus primarily on the analysis of a single game, relatively 
few studies have tried to examine demand for more than one game simultaneously.  
Since many states offer multiple concurrent games, it is reasonable to expect the relative 
effective prices of competing games to influence the choices of players.  Purfield and 
Waldron (1999) examine the substitutability/complementarity between lotto and fixed-
odds betting in Ireland.  Using an effective price model, their results suggest a 
complementary relationship between the two types of lottery games.  Forrest, Gulley, 
and Simmons (2004) evaluate the extent to which games in the UKNL are substitutes or 
complements using the EPM.  For each game in their sample, they regress sales on the 
own effective price as well as the effective prices of other games. They conclude that 
UK lottery games operate independently of each other, with little evidence to suggest 
any cross-price effects.   
Analyzing data from three US states, Grote and Matheson (2006) compare the 
sales relationship between a state-run lotto game and Powerball, a multi-state lotto game.  
They develop a simple log-form model, regressing sales on the jackpot and a dummy 
representing the addition of the multi-state game.  They conclude that while the addition 
of a new multi-state game tends to cannibalize the sales of smaller single-state games 
initially, the two appear to exhibit a complementary relationship thereafter.  Forrest, 
Gulley, and Simmons (2010) analyzes the relationship between lottery play and 
bookmaker betting, which includes horse racing, soccer, and numbers betting.  They 
argue that these two categories of gaming are quite different from one another for a 
number of reasons.  First, while many betting games require some skill for players to 
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seek out value, lotteries, on the other hand, are a game of pure chance.  Second, betting 
games tend to offer much higher expected returns with lower skewness than lotteries.  
Third, the size of their markets differs greatly, with betting markets only attracting a 
small fraction of the population.  The authors find that according to the data gathered 
from bookmakers in the UK as well as the UK National Lottery, there is evidence that 
players tend to substitute away from bookmaker betting when the expected return to the 
lottery is unusually high (due to rollovers or special draws). 
A more recent paper by Perez and Forrest (2011) takes the approach of 
measuring own- and cross-price elasticities to determine the potential relationship 
competing games have with each other, using data collected from a portfolio of three 
lotto games in Spain.  The authors use a log-log effective price model estimated 
equation-by-equation for each game in a fashion similar to Forrest, Gulley and Simmons 
(2004).  They find that own-price elasticities are uniformly less than negative one and 
argue that since the take-out rates in Spain are more generous to the consumer than in 
other jurisdictions, this result is not surprising.  The authors also find that the cross-price 
estimates are small and not statistically significant.  They attribute this finding to the 
ability of the lottery operator to minimize the extent to which the sales are cannibalized.  
This evidence substantiates the claim that lottery games can be treated as unrelated 
goods. 
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2.  ADDRESSING SOURCES OF ESTIMATION BIAS IN THE EFFECTIVE PRICE 
MODEL OF LOTTERY DEMAND 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Lottery betting exhibits a number of important characteristics that differentiate it 
from other, more traditional, economic goods.  These characteristics have required 
researchers to develop unique strategies for modeling demand behavior.  When an 
individual purchases a lottery tickets, they pay a fixed nominal price in exchange for a 
small chance at winning a large sum of money. Thus, the utility of the transaction is ex 
ante uncertain.  Furthermore, the price of a ticket is fixed and cannot be used to predict 
the time-variation in sales according to a traditional price/quantity demand relationship.  
The effective price model (EPM) pioneered by Cook and Clotfelter (1993) and Gulley 
and Scott (1993) provides an innovative approach to model demand behavior in the 
presence of these issues.  
The EPM addresses the problem of uncertainty by measuring the expected value 
of a lottery bet as a function of total ticket sales as well as the odds and prize amounts 
for each available prize tier. This measurement provides the expected return a player 
receives in exchange for paying the nominal ticket price.  In order to resolve the issue of 
identifying a demand relationship under a fixed price, the drawing-by-drawing variation 
in ticket sales is measured in response to rollover-induced changes in the expected value.  
Since a ticket purchased in a relatively high-jackpot drawing has a greater value than one 
purchased in a relatively low-jackpot drawing (due to its higher expected value), an 
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effective price can be defined to reflect the difference in value between drawings with 
different expected values.  According to the EPM of Gulley and Scott (1993), the 
effective price for a given drawing is defined to be the difference between the fixed 
nominal price and the variable expected value.  Thus as the jackpot increases, the 
effective price of a ticket decreases because the difference between the nominal price 
and the expected value gets smaller.  Since ticket sales tend to be greater in drawings 
with higher jackpots, the demand curve can be modeled as the relationship between the 
quantity of tickets sold and the effective price. 
In order to estimate the demand relationship econometrically, the EPM provides 
a rather straightforward approach.  Log total ticket sales are linearly regressed on the log 
effective price, allowing the estimated coefficient to be interpreted as the price elasticity 
of demand.  This elasticity then can be used to evaluate whether the lottery game is 
optimally priced.  Since the effective price defined above also represents the average 
profit per ticket, an effective price elasticity of -1 would correspond to a situation where 
a 1% increase in the effective price would be equally offset 1% decrease in sales, or the 
point of maximum average profit.  According to the model, comparing the proximity of 
the game’s estimated price elasticity to -1 will determine whether the game is optimally 
priced. 
Despite its popularity over the last 20 years as the standard model for analyzing 
demand for lottery tickets, the EPM still exhibits potentially important shortcomings.  
The aim of this essay is to address three methodological issues that if not properly 
addressed could cause biased estimates of the effective price elasticity:  (1) the treatment 
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of observations exhibiting super-unitary expected values, (2) controlling for the 
endogeneity of the effective price, and (3) whether reporting a single price elasticity 
estimated at the sample mean accurately summarizes behavior along the entire curve. 
In order to address the treatment of observations with super-unitary expected 
values, I approach the problem from a new angle by redefining the effective price 
concept in a way that has better properties for estimating demand elasticities.  Again, 
previous work has typically defined the effective price as the difference between the 
nominal price, P and the expected value, EV.  Since P minus EV equals the expected 
profit per ticket, this approaches the demand relationship from the perspective of a 
profit-maximizing lottery controller. 
Despite this definition’s intuitive appeal, drawings with large jackpots can 
exhibit expected values that exceed the nominal cost of a ticket.  In such cases, the 
effective price is negative and thus undefined under the logarithmic econometric 
specifications that are commonly used in this line of research.  These observations are 
particularly important because they arise when the lottery controller not only sells the 
most tickets but also must pay out the most money if the jackpot is won.  Thus, failing to 
include them in estimation of the model could have a large impact on estimation results.  
One proposed solution is to include these observations after censoring the effective price 
above zero (Perez and Forrest 2011), but for games where super-unitary expected values 
are not uncommon, the bias from censoring could remain problematic.  To address this 
issue, I explore two alternative modeling approaches:  (1) the use of a semi-log 
specification and (2) the use of a new effective price definition that approaches the 
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problem from the perspective of consumers who are purchasing chances to win P 
dollars.  Every ticket purchased is EV chances at an effective price of P/EV per chance.  
This alternative price definition is positive under the entire range of expected values, 
hence, it is possible to compare estimation results from samples that omit or include 
super-unitary expected values. 
Second, I develop a new method to address the potential endogeneity of the 
effective price.  Endogeneity arises because the winner’s expected share of the prize 
pool depends upon the total number of sales.  The effective price depends upon the 
player’s prediction of these sales, but only actual sales are observed in the data.  
Previous studies treat this problem by estimating a first-stage regression of the effective 
price on exogenous market indicators known to players before the drawing takes place, 
such as sales under similarly-sized jackpots, the rollover amount of the game, and the 
jackpots of competing games.  The predicted values of the effective price from the first-
stage regression then are inserted into the second stage, where sales are regressed on the 
effective price.  To circumvent the need for a two-stage method, I explore the use of a 
publicly available source of sales prediction information created by the lottery controller 
itself and published on its website.  Since players have easy access to these predictions, 
which are highly accurate, I argue that they provide a less noisy approximation to the 
priors formed by individual players. 
Third, I use non-parametric methods to estimate the demand relationship between 
effective price and quantity.  Previous research using a log-log regression framework 
estimates a single weighted-average price elasticity. This may serve as an appropriate 
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statistic for goods that do not exhibit much price variation; however, lotto games 
experience wide fluctuations in the effective price. Reporting a single elasticity to 
summarize price sensitivity may obscure important attributes of the demand curve; 
therefore I employ a non-parametric locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) 
estimator to determine whether the data exhibit different elasticities along the demand 
curve and discuss the implications of this result in terms of optimal pricing. 
To preview the main empirical results using data on sales for the Texas-operated 
game Lotto Texas from 2006 to 2009, I find that omitting drawings with super-unitary 
expected values introduces bias that is six-times greater than that from ignoring the 
potential endogeneity of effective price. This bias arises because high-jackpot games 
tend to yield large negative expected profit. In addition, the demand elasticity varies 
significantly across different modeling specifications; nevertheless, the estimated 
elasticity of sales with respect to expected profit per ticket is everywhere inelastic, which 
would suggest that profits would increase by increasing the price of a lotto ticket. 
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2.2  METHODOLOGY 
 
 
2.2.1  Data Censoring Problem 
In the market for on-line lottery games, players observe two different prices.  
First is the nominal (explicit) price of a lottery ticket, usually $1, and is what the player 
actually exchanges in return for a chance at a cash prize.  Second is the effective 
(implicit) price, which is derived from the expected value of a bet, given the odds of 
winning, the payouts to the winners, and the likelihood of a tie where the prize is split.  
The implicit value of purchasing a ticket changes from drawing to drawing as successive 
rollovers increase the value of a bet or as resetting the jackpot (in the event of a win) 
decreases the value of a bet. Modeling demand in terms of the effective price describes 
the effect that this implicit cost has on the number of tickets players choose to purchase.  
This approach is better suited econometrically since the use of rolling jackpots provides 
substantial variation in the effective price over time, creating an identifiable market 
demand curve.  The equilibrium quantity for lottery tickets is completely determined by 
demand and does not in any way confound estimates of demand-side relationships. 
Although the effective price serves as an artificial means by which to explain the 
variation in sales, it should still permit reasonable economic interpretations rather than 
be an ad hoc specification that happens to have an inverse relationship with sales.  The 
most common definition used in the literature (see Gulley and Scott (1993); Scoggins 
(1995); and Forrest, Gulley, and Simmons (2000)) is  
A P EV  . [2.1] 
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This approach is more aptly suited to modeling demand from the perspective of the 
lottery controller.  By directly factoring in the payouts to the players, expression [2.1] 
mathematically represents the average profit per ticket to the lottery controller and can 
be used to measure total profits by multiplying it by the number of tickets sold.  
However, when this definition is used in a log-log econometric framework (which is the 
most common specification used in the literature), the model may suffer from a 
substantial methodological problem.  When the jackpot of a lotto game gets sufficiently 
large, it is possible for the expected value of a bet to actually exceed the nominal price of 
a ticket.  When this situation happens, the effective price is negative and thus the log 
transformation is not defined.  
One approach to solve this problem would be to simply omit these observations 
from the sample, but it is clear that this omission will result in biased estimates.  Perez 
and Forrest (2011) propose that the expected values of these observations could be 
censored just below the nominal price.  Thus for a nominal price of $1, all observations 
that meet or exceed $1 should be censored at $0.99.  Again, if the number of data points 
that need to be censored is relatively large, then the prospect of biased estimates is still a 
valid concern.  Since there is no way to test the degree of bias within the current 
framework, an entirely new framework is needed to explore this problem further. 
In response, I propose two alternative modeling strategies that can be used to 
address this problem.  First, demand can be estimated using a semi-log framework, 
where log sales are regressed on an absolute measure of the effective price.  In this case, 
the slope coefficient measures the relative change in sales for a given absolute change in 
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the value of the effective price.  Second, I explore the option of redefining the effective 
price in a way that does not yield negative values. This will allow the log-log framework 
to be maintained.   
The most straightforward approach to address the data censoring issue would be 
to adapt a semi-log regression framework.  Under a semi-log specification, the 
regression model becomes: 
0 1 2 3log ,otherQ trend A A          [2.2] 
where Q is the total tickets sales, trend is a time trend, A is the effective price defined in 
[2.1], Aother is the effective price of a bet for a competing lotto game, and µ is the error 
term.  The coefficient of interest, β2, measures the percentage change in sales in response 
to an absolute change in the average profit per ticket A.   While the price coefficient does 
not represent an elasticity, the price elasticity evaluated at the sample mean can be 
obtained by multiplying β2 by the sample mean of A. 
Should it be desirable to maintain the log-log framework, the data censoring 
problem can be resolved by redefining the effective price in a way that does not results 
in negative prices for observations with super-unitary expected values.  Consider the 
following definition:  
Pp
EV
 . [2.3] 
Given a typical nominal price of $1, this definition measures the price as the cost of a 
chance to win a dollar.  To illustrate, consider a drawing where the expected value is 
computed to be $.50.  In this case, the player would expect to pay two dollars on average 
for every dollar they win.  Thus the effective price to the consumer for such a bet would 
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be $2.  Not only is P/EV inversely related to quantity,12it does not impart negative values 
for observations with super-unitary expected values.  Defining the effective price in this 
manner does not directly incorporate the lottery controller’s costs associated with prize 
payouts, this method is thereby more aptly described as modeling price from the 
perspective of the consumer.  Therefore any resulting analysis using this definition will 
appeal directly in terms total revenue, and not total profits.  While expression [2.3] 
represents the true implicit cost to the consumer, it does not change the fact that players 
are still only paying $1 for each bet they make in a given drawing.  Total revenue is 
obtained by multiplying total ticket sales by the nominal price per ticket, or   
TR P Q  .   [2.4] 
Expression [2.3] is an identity that must be preserved in the face of converting from the 
nominal price to the effective price.  Therefore, in order to preserve this identity, the 
nominal quantity Q must be redefined as well. Multiplying Q by the expected value or 
q Q EV   [2.5] 
provides the necessary “effective” quantity, q.  Expression [2.6] mathematically 
illustrates how p and q preserve the total revenue identity:  
   $Pp q Q EV P Q TREV        . [2.6] 
The effective quantity is not without an economic interpretation, representing EV 
purchased chances to win a dollar.   
                                                 
1Garrett and Sobel (2004) use 1/EV in their demand model (P = $1) to preserve the inverse relationship 
between price and sales with a footnote indicating the use of 1-EV provided similar results. However, it is 
not made clear why the authors chose the former over the latter. 
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FIGURE 2.1. Scatter Plot of Effective Price against Both Nominal and Effective Quantities 
 for Lotto Texas 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.1 graphically illustrates this transformation using two superimposed 
scatter plots of price and quantity for 385 independent drawings of the game Lotto 
Texas.  The right-most plot (marked by black dots) graphically depicts the relationship 
between the effective price (p) against the nominal quantity (Q).  The left-most plot 
(marked by gray x’s) depicts the relationship between the effective price (p) against the 
effective quantity (q).  Transforming sales in this fashion provides the economically 
correct relationship between price and quantity using the definition of P/EV for the 
effective price.  It is important to note the highly non-linear relationship between the 
effective price and the effective quantity. 
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As discussed earlier, preceding papers in the literature predominantly rely upon 
the effective price definition of P–EV in a log-log econometric model to estimate the 
effective price elasticity.  The model is given by 
0 1 2 3log log log ,otherQ trend A A          [2.7] 
where Q is the total tickets sales, trend is a time trend, A is the effective price, Aother is 
the effective price of a bet for a competing lotto game, and µ is the error term.  The 
coefficient of interest, β2, measures the percentage change in sales in response to a one 
percent change in the average profit per ticket A.   Since this specification does not allow 
a direct test of the degree of bias incurred by censoring the data, expression [2.7] is 
modified to suit the new effective price definition of  p = P/EV:   
0 1 2 3log log log ,otherq trend p p          [2.8] 
where q represents the total effective quantity defined in expression [2.5]; trend is a time 
trend, p is the effective price, pother is the effective price of a bet for a competing lotto 
game, and µ is the error term.  In this case, β2 provides the mean elasticity of the 
effective quantity q with respect to the consumer’s effective price p.  This specification 
does allow a comparison of results obtained from the full sample against those obtained 
from omitting or censoring the super-unitary expected value observations. 
 
2.2.2  Expected Value of a Lottery Bet 
 Typically an on-line lottery game will offer a grand prize (jackpot) along with 
several smaller prize tiers that are awarded based upon how well a winning player’s 
selected numbers match up to an official, random draw.  For large games, the probability 
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of winning the jackpot is extremely small, since it requires the matching of all numbers 
perfectly (for example matching 6 numbers randomly chosen from a field of 54 yields 
odds of 1:25,827,165).  However, this situation gives the game operator the ability to 
offer very large base jackpots, which can range from hundreds of thousands of dollars to 
hundreds of millions of dollars, depending on the size and popularity of the game.  If a 
game employs a rollover, this characteristic allows for even larger jackpots since the 
amount allocated to the top prize will be moved into the next drawing’s pool in the event 
the top prize is not won.  In the case of a tie (i.e. more than one player’s numbers exactly 
match the official draw) pari-mutuel rules require the splitting of the prize pool among 
all winners.  This leads to an interesting trade-off in the face of increased ticket sales; on 
one hand, as more people play, the larger will be the amount a player stands to win, but 
on the other hand, it increases the chances a tie will occur (Cook and Clotfelter, 1993).  
This situation can be true even if jackpots are determined and advertised a period ahead, 
because the expected value also is a function of lower-tier prizes whose prize pools may 
be set as a fixed percentage of total sales.  
The expected value of a winning the jackpot on a single lottery bet can be 
expressed by the following equation 
     jackpotEV probability x jackpot x share , [2.9] 
which represents the probability of matching all numbers multiplied by both the jackpot 
amount and the winner’s expected share of the jackpot.  Cook and Clotfelter (1993) 
point out that under the assumption that the numbers chosen by players are uniformly 
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distributed across the set of all players2,3 the expected share can be approximated using a 
Poisson approximation to the binomial distribution for the probability of observing x 
winners in N independent random trials with probability π of success.  Under the Poisson 
approximation, the expected value winning the jackpot on a single bet becomes 
 
0
1
1 !
xN
N
jackpot
x
N
EV jackpot e
x x
  

 
    
  
 , [2.10] 
which can be simplified further to 
 1 Njackpot
jackpot
EV e
N
  . [2.11] 
where N is total ticket sales of all other players and θ is the probability of winning the 
jackpot. Computing the expected value for the lower-tier prizes is done in a similar 
fashion.  The total expected value of a bet is simply the sum of the EVs over all prize 
tiers, or 
jackpot otherEV EV EV  . [2.12]  
The share of the total expected value of a ticket made up by the lower-tier prizes is much 
smaller compared to that of the jackpot.  Since the state takes a significant share of the 
ticket sales, this value is usually less than one dollar, but grows as rollovers increase the 
jackpot.  It is even possible for a lottery to occasionally experience expected values 
                                                 
2 Farrell, Hartley, Lanot, and Walker (2000) argue that this assumption does not necessarily hold.  
According to their lottery data, they find far more rollovers than expected, which suggests that individuals 
may not pick numbers at random.  This situation can happen when, for example, individuals rely 
frequently upon choosing numbers based on the dates of special events (e.g. birthdays & anniversaries), 
perceived “lucky” numbers (e.g. 7 & 11), or shy away from perceived “unlucky” numbers (e.g. 13).  Thus, 
in the face of non-uniform number choice (or conscious selection), the use of the Poisson approximation 
for the expected share calculation may be slightly biased.  I recognize the potential for bias in assuming a 
uniform distribution of numbers across players in a given drawing, however the data do not allow me to 
control for conscious selection. 
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greater than one if enough periods go by without the sale of a winning ticket, causing a 
bet to become more than fair to the player. 
 
2.2.3  Endogeneity of the Effective Price 
It is evident that in the context of lottery games, a regression of quantity on the 
effective price will suffer from endogeneity.  Endogeneity arises because the effective 
price is a function of total sales, which are not determined until after sales have closed 
for a drawing.  Since the true effective price is not knowable before all bets have been 
taken, players must form an expectation of the post-drawing total sales in their 
purchasing decisions.  Players’ expectations are unobservable and must be 
approximated.  Previous papers (including Gulley and Scott (1993); and Forrest, Gulley, 
and Simmons (2000)) attempt to remedy this problem by running a two-stage estimation 
procedure.  In the first stage, the ex post price (computed using sales ex post of the 
drawing) is regressed on all relevant observable information that was likely available to 
players at the time of purchase, before the occurrence of the drawing. Such information 
includes prior rollover amounts, prior sales under similarly sized jackpots, etc.  The 
predicted values of the first-stage regression then are included in a second-stage 
regression specified according to expression [2.7] above. 
While the two-stage method attempts to take advantage of information made 
available before a given drawing takes place, it still suffers from the problem of omitted 
variables.  The dataset used in this study provides a unique and more accurate remedy.  
In Texas, on-line games with advertised jackpots are managed according to a specific 
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timeline.  Before sales begin for a particular drawing, the Texas Lottery Commission 
(TLC) sets a fixed value for the jackpot of the upcoming drawing.  This value is 
advertised for the duration that sales are active, usually until just before the drawing 
actually occurs.  Since the advertised jackpot is set beforehand, the TLC must make a 
prediction as to how many tickets will be sold for the upcoming drawing in order to 
ensure there will be the necessary funds to support the jackpot.  This prediction is made 
according to their own model that factors in the sales of recent drawings, as well as any 
other market conditions that are known to affect sales, such as holidays, natural 
disasters, or even dates that players may likely perceive to be lucky (e.g. 7/7/2007).  The 
exact specification of the prediction model is proprietary and incorporates information 
that is not likely observable to the econometrician.  However, their sales predictions are 
made publicly available on the TLC’s website before sales are opened for the 
corresponding drawing.  Assuming either the TLC’s prediction model reasonably 
approximates a representative player’s prediction or that a representative player monitors 
the TLC’s prediction and uses it for their own, then this value may used to compute the 
ex ante effective price, entirely avoiding the need for a two-stage model that relies upon 
a weaker set of information. 
 
2.2.4  Use of a Mean-evaluated Price Elasticity 
 The use of a single price elasticity evaluated at the sample mean is a common 
practice in demand analysis.  Since a price elasticity is only a local measure of price 
sensitivity, reporting the elasticity at the sample mean works well for goods that 
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experience only small changes in prices.  In the case of lottery betting, the presence of 
rollovers creates substantial variation in the effective price making it harder to justify the 
reporting of only a single estimate.  To illustrate, I refer back to the Lotto Texas 
example.  Using the effective price definition of Gulley and Scott (1993) according to 
expression [2.1], according to 385 independent drawings from April 2006 to Dec 2009, 
Lotto Texas experiences a range of effective prices from a high of $0.83 to a low of -
$0.86 (if we allow the price to remain uncensored), with a sample mean of  $0.52.  The 
data are also heavily skewed, with the bulk of the observations occurring at the high-
price/low-sales side.  On the other hand, even though fewer observations occur at the 
low-price side, the number of sales at these points is much higher.  The same argument 
can still be made when moving to the consumer analogue of a demand curve based on 
the relationship between the new effective price (expression [2.2]) and the effective 
quantity (expression [2.4]).  If thought in terms of average profit to the lottery controller, 
it is reasonable to suspect that drawings occurring on one side of the demand curve may 
be more lucrative than drawings occurring at the other.  Therefore basing conclusions 
about the game’s overall performance on a single statistic appears to be misguided. 
In the literature on demand for lottery betting, the use of a log-log specification 
not only compels the estimated price coefficient to be interpreted at the sample mean, 
but also suffers from an imposed curvature restriction that demand is everywhere iso-
elastic at that value, which does not allow for the elasticity to change as you move along 
the curve.  To explore the potential for the locus of points along a lottery demand curve 
to exhibit different elasticities, I move away from a parametric estimator that relies upon 
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a specific functional form and employ a non-parametric locally weighted scatterplot 
smoothing (LOWESS) estimator.  LOWESS smoothing (Cleveland (1979); Cleveland 
and Devlin (1988)) is a locally weighted polynomial regression, wherein each point in 
the sample is fitted to a local subset of the data by a low-degree polynomial using 
weighted least squares (giving higher weight to the points that are closer to the point 
whose response is being estimated).  LOWESS provides a highly flexible smoothing 
estimate and is ideal for use on datasets that are densely sampled.  This characteristic is 
valuable because it avoids imposing a rigid structure on the curvature of the lottery data.   
The LOWESS smoother was used obtain two different demand curve estimates.  
FIGURE 2.2 illustrates the use of a LOWESS regression of sales quantity (Q) on the 
average profit per ticket (effective price [2.1]) for the game Lotto Texas.  The gray dots 
represent a mapping of the effective price against quantity.  The black line represents the 
smoothed LOWESS fitted values.  These values were estimated using STATA at a 
bandwidth setting of 0.8.  
Using the LOWESS predicted values as the fitted demand curve, arc elasticities 
were computed at each individual point to determine the degree of variation along the 
curve.  The arc elasticities are mapped against their respective effective prices in 
FIGURE 2.3.  In this figure, the gray dots denote the computed arc elasticity.  The black 
dots designate a second LOWESS smoothing which was used to help identify the 
underlying trend over the effective price range.  According to the data, it is clear that the 
arc elasticity at each point does not remain constant along the demand curve, but actually 
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appears to become more elastic as the effective price decreases, with a slight upward 
turn beyond $0.70.   
This analysis was replicated over the alternative effective price definition of p = 
P/EV (expression [2.3]) as well.  FIGURE 2.4 illustrates the use of a LOWESS 
regression of the effective quantity q on the new effective price p using a bandwidth of 
0.8.  Again, the gray dots represent a mapping of the effective price/effective quantity 
pairs, while the black dots denote the LOWESS fitted values.  Similarly, the arc 
elasticities are computed at each point along the demand curve and plotted against the 
effective price in FIGURE 2.5.  The black dots in the figure denote the LOWESS fitted 
arc elasticities in order to reveal the underlying trend as the effective price varies.  Both 
FIGURES 2.3 and 2.5 provide substantial evidence that the price elasticity is not 
constant along the demand curve, making it hard to not only justify the dependence upon 
a single price elasticity to summarize the demand for this game, but to restrict the model 
to fit an iso-elastic curve. 
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FIGURE 2.2. LOWESS Smoothing of Effective Price (A = P – EV) and Quantity (Q)  
of Lotto Texas 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.3. LOWESS Smoothing of Lotto Texas Arc Elasticities under the Effective Price  
of A = P – EV 
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FIGURE 2.4. LOWESS Smoothing of Effective Price (p = P/EV) and Effective Quantity 
 (q = Q/EV) of Lotto Texas 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.5. LOWESS Smoothing of Lotto Texas Arc Elasticities under the Effective Price   
p = P/EV 
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2.2.5  Profit Maximization Problem 
 In addressing the issue of improving lottery profitability through price analysis, 
much of the literature appears to be concerned with obtaining price elasticities in order 
to determine the optimal direction of price changes.  To do this, a number of preceding 
lottery demand studies, including Gulley and Scott (1993); Forrest, Gulley, and 
Simmons (2000); and Perez and Forrest (2011) appeal to the results of a static 
optimization problem of a lottery controller’s profit for a single game.  Total profit is 
obtained by subtracting total expected payouts, X, from total revenue,  
P Q X    . [2.13] 
With the nominal price P fixed at $1, algebraic manipulation of expression [2.13] yields 
profit in terms of the per-ticket average profit from expression [2.1]: 
 
1
1
.
X
Q
Q
Q EV
Q A

 
   
 
  
 
 [2.14] 
For notational simplicity, let 1–EV be denoted by A.  Since Q is a function of A, the 
objective function becomes: 
   max
A
A Q A A    [2.15] 
Taking the derivative of profit with respect to the A yields: 
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 [2.16] 
This result implies that average profit is maximized if the elasticity of sales with respect 
to A is equal to negative one, at which point a one percent increase in the average profit 
per ticket is exactly offset by a one percent decrease in the quantity of tickets sold.  
Preceding papers compare their estimated effective price elasticities to this optimal value 
as a test for the optimal pricing of a lottery game.  
Since this paper explores the consumer analogue of the lottery controller’s 
effective price problem, the objective function needs to be re-specified according to the 
new effective price/quantity definitions from expressions [2.3] and [2.5].  As I have 
shown through expression [2.6] above, total revenue is simply the product of p and q.  
Thus total profit is obtained by subtracting the total expected payout q from total 
revenue: 
( ) ( )
1 ( )
1
(1 ).
p q p q p
sales EV sales EV
EV
sales sales EV
sales EV
   
    
   
  
 
 
 
 [2.17]
The lottery controller’s objective function becomes  
max ( ) ( )
p
p q p q p      , [2.18] 
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where the first-order condition with respect to the effective price yields 
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 [2.19] 
In this case, the profit-maximizing price elasticity becomes a function of the expected 
value of a bet, implying the elasticity that maximizes the lottery controller’s objective 
function is different for every realized expected value. 
 This siutation leads to an interesting question of how to determine whether the 
lottery is optimally priced.  As demonstrated in the previous subsection regarding the use 
of a mean-evaluated price elasticity, the data suggest that demand is not iso-elastic.  
Therefore the results of the static optimization problem indicate that in order to 
maximize profits, the elasticities of the empirical demand curve should equal the derived 
optimal elasticity at each individual effective price.   
 
2.3  DATA 
The data for this study were collected from public records provided by the Texas 
Lottery Commission (TLC) and include daily sales, advertised jackpots, and odds at 
each prize tier for the games Lotto Texas spanning April 2006 to year’s end 2009.  This 
information also was collected for the games Texas Two Step and Mega Millions, which 
  
34 
are also offered by the TLC with effective prices that enter the model as a control for 
competing games.  Summary statistics for Lotto Texas are provided in TABLE 2.1.   
 
TABLE 2.1. Descriptive Statistics and Prize Information 
 
  
 N = 385 Mean (μ) St. Dev. (σ) Min Max 
Ticket Sales 2,106,588 491,836 1,377,250 4,208,545 
Top Prize 17,220,779 14,533,925 4,000,000 76,000,000 
Expected Value (EV) 0.48 0.33 0.17 1.86 
Effective Price: A = 1-EV 0.52 0.67 -0.86 0.83 
Effective Price: p = 1/EV 2.81 1.35 0.53 5.81 
  
   
  
  1st Prize 2nd Prize 3rd Prize 4th Prize 
Prize Amount Jackpot* $2000* $50* $3** 
Odds 1:25,827,165 1:89,678 1:1,526 1:75 
*Pari-mutuel prize,  ** Guaranteed prize 
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Tickets for Lotto Texas are available for purchase every day of the week, but the 
actual drawings are only held on Wednesday and Saturday evenings.  Sales per drawing 
range from 1.4 million to 4.2 million, with an average of approximately 2.1 million over 
the sample period.  The base jackpot for Lotto Texas is $4 million reaching a high of $76 
million, resulting from 47 drawings without a winner.  The range of expected values 
spans the interval of $0.17 to $1.86, with a mean of $0.48.  Thus in the long run, players 
can expect approximately $0.48 for every dollar they spend.  Descriptive statistics for 
the two effective price definitions are given as well.  Regarding the effective price from 
the lottery controller’s perspective, A, the average profit per ticket sold is $0.52, and 
ranges from a high of $0.83 to a low of -$0.86.  From the perspective of consumers, the 
effective price, p, ranges from $0.54 to $5.81, with a mean of $2.81.  Again, this value 
represents the amount a player must spend, on average, in order to win a dollar. 
Lotto Texas offers four prize tiers, each corresponding to whether all or some of 
the numbers are correctly matched.   In each drawing six numbers are randomly obtained 
from a field of 54.  The jackpot is won by matching all six at odds of 1:25,827,165.  The 
2nd and 3rd prizes are awarded from matching 5 and 4 balls, respectively.  Since these 
prize tiers also are pari-mutuel, the amount a winner receives will depend on both the 
total draw sales as well as the number of co-winners.  On average these values are 
$2,000 and $50, respectively.  The 4th prize, for matching 3 numbers correctly, is 
guaranteed at $3, regardless of the number of co-winners. 
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TABLE 2.2. Log-Log Lotto Texas Regressions (P – EV Approach) 
 
Dependent Variable: Sales (in logs)                     
Independent effective price variables are each measured in logs 
        
  
  
                
  
  
  
OLS (actual sales) 2SLS OLS (predicted sales) 
  
  
(i) 
 
(ii) 
 
(iii) (iv) 
 
(v) 
 
(vi) (vii) 
 
(viii) 
 
(ix) 
  
  
Unaltered 
 
Dropped 
 
Censored Unaltered 
 
Dropped 
 
Censored Unaltered 
 
Dropped 
 
Censored 
  
 
  n = 385 
 
n = 345 
 
n = 385 n = 385 
 
n = 345 
 
n = 385 n = 385 
 
n = 345 
 
n = 385 
Price (Lotto Texas) ---  
-0.1467 
 
-0.1435 --- 
 
-0.2009 
 
-0.1615 --- 
 
-0.1656 
 
-0.1459 
--- 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 --- 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 --- 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Period ---   -0.0003   -0.0003 ---   -0.0004   -0.0004 ---   -0.0004   -0.0003 
---   0.000   0.000 ---   0.000   0.000 ---   0.000   0.000 
Price (Mega Mil) ---  
-0.0626 
 
-0.0325 --- 
 
-0.0394 
 
-0.0134 --- 
 
-0.0591 
 
-0.0322 
--- 
 
0.000 
 
0.129 --- 
 
0.022 
 
0.351 --- 
 
0.002 
 
0.141 
Price (2 Step) ---   0.0049   -0.0086 ---   0.0044   -0.0078 ---   0.0045   -0.0086 
---   0.739   0.539 ---   0.773   0.296 ---   0.843   0.535 
Constant ---  
14.4873 
 
14.4881 --- 
 
14.4730 
 
14.4896 --- 
 
14.4804 
 
14.4876 
---   0.000   0.000 ---   0.000   0.000 ---   0.000   0.000 
Serial Correlation 
               D-W Statistic --- 
 
1.703 
 
1.380 --- 
 
1.783 
 
1.341 --- 
 
1.746 
 
1.384 
Q-stat (p-value) --- 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 --- 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 --- 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Order (lags) ---   3   3 ---   2   2  ---   3   3 
P-values are calculated using Newey-West standard errors and are reported under each coefficient estimate 
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TABLE 2.3. Log-Log Lotto Texas Regressions (P/EV Approach) 
 
Dependent Variable: Effective quantity (in logs)                     
Independent effective price variables are each measured in logs 
        
  
  
                
  
  
  
OLS (actual sales) 2SLS OLS (predicted sales) 
  
  
(i) 
 
(ii) 
 
(iii) (iv) 
 
(v) 
 
(vi) (vii) 
 
(viii) 
 
(ix) 
  
  
Unaltered 
 
Dropped 
 
Censored Unaltered 
 
Dropped 
 
Censored Unaltered 
 
Dropped 
 
Censored 
  
 
  n = 385 
 
n = 345 
 
n = 385 n = 385 
 
n = 345 
 
n = 385 n = 385 
 
n = 345 
 
n = 385 
Price (Lotto Texas) -1.3187  
-1.2197 
 
-1.4258 -1.3606 
 
-1.2335 
 
-1.6225 -1.3016 
 
-1.2009 
 
-1.4034 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Period -0.0004   -0.0004   -0.0002 -0.0004   -0.0037   -0.0037 -0.0003   -0.0004   -0.0003 
0.000   0.000   0.175 0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.178 
Price (Mega Mil) -0.0305  
-0.0425 
 
-0.0328 -0.0138 
 
-0.0385 
 
0.0393 -0.0295 
 
-0.0422 
 
-0.0323 
0.066 
 
0.003 
 
0.324 0.328 
 
0.002 
 
0.190 0.076 
 
0.003 
 
0.330 
Price (2 Step) -0.0203   -0.0086   0.0022 -0.0174   -0.0087   0.0136 -0.0205   -0.0093   0.0015 
0.255   0.690   0.955 0.354   0.641   0.741 0.254   0.662   0.970 
Constant 14.9848  
14.8799 
 
15.0704 15.0109 
 
14.8909 
 
15.1985 14.9881 
 
14.8811 
 
15.0711 
0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 
Serial Correlation 
               D-W Statistic 1.206 
 
1.769 
 
0.440 1.234 
 
1.792 
 
0.716 1.182 
 
1.793 
 
0.443 
Q-stat (p-value) 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Order (lags) 4 
 
4 
 
4 2   2   2 2 
 
3 
 
4 
P-values are calculated using Newey-West standard errors and are reported under each coefficient estimate 
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TABLE 2.4. Semi-Log Lotto Texas Regressions (P – EV Approach) 
 
Dependent Variable: Sales (in logs)                     
Independent effective price variables are each measured absolutely 
        
  
  
                
  
  
  
OLS (actual sales) 2SLS OLS (predicted sales) 
  
  
(i) 
 
(ii) 
 
(iii) (iv) 
 
(v) 
 
(vi) (vii) 
 
(viii) 
 
(ix) 
  
  
Unaltered 
 
Dropped 
 
Censored Unaltered 
 
Dropped 
 
Censored Unaltered 
 
Dropped 
 
Censored 
  
 
  n = 385 
 
n = 345 
 
n = 385 n = 385 
 
n = 345 
 
n = 385 n = 385 
 
n = 345 
 
n = 385 
Price (Lotto Texas) -0.5577  
-0.5379 
 
-0.7474 -0.5612 
 
-0.5393 
 
-0.8391 -0.5614 
 
-0.5387 
 
-0.7456 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Period -0.0004   -0.0004   -0.0003 -0.0004   -0.0004   -0.0004 -0.0037   -0.0004   -0.0003 
0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 
Price (Mega Mil) -0.0923  
-0.0950 
 
-0.0570 -0.0865 
 
-0.0945 
 
-0.0140 -0.0851 
 
-0.0942 
 
-0.0556 
0.001 
 
0.008 
 
0.127 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.672 0.005 
 
0.008 
 
0.127 
Price (2 Step) -0.0165   0.0021   0.0034 -0.0348   0.0021   0.0102 -0.0344   0.0021   -0.0019 
0.526   0.957   0.901 0.149   0.951   0.764 0.262   0.958   0.936 
Constant 15.0108  
14.9883 
 
15.0915 15.0218 
 
14.9889 
 
15.1185 15.0236 
 
14.9912 
 
15.0962 
0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 
Price Elasticity 
(Lotto Texas) -0.249 
 
-0.239 
 
-0.332 -0.249 
 
-0.239 
 
-0.373 -0.249   -0.239   -0.331 
Serial Correlation                     
    
  
D-W Statistic 1.898 
 
1.985 
 
1.269 1.899 
 
1.987 
 
1.260 1.906 
 
1.990 
 
1.285 
Q-stat (p-value) 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Order (lags) 3   3   3 2 
 
2 
 
2 3   3   2 
P-values are calculated using Newey-West standard errors and are reported under each coefficient estimate 
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2.4  RESULTS 
TABLES 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 summarize the results of 9 different regression 
specifications under three EPM approaches: (1) log-log with p = P – EV, (2) log-log 
with A = P/EV, and (3) semi-log with A = P – EV, respectively.  The columns are 
organized first according to the method by which endogeneity is addressed:  OLS 
without controlling for endogeneity, two-stage least squares, and the direct use of 
predicted sales.  Then the columns are sorted by the treatment of observations with 
super-unitary expected values: unaltered, omitted, and censored at $0.99.  The data were 
tested for serial correlation using a Ljung-Box test (Q statistic).  These test statistics, 
along with the Durbin-Watson test statistics reported in the table.   A correlogram was 
used for each regression to determine the appropriate number of lags to specify in the 
correction procedure.  In order to control for the presence of serial correlation, Newey-
West standard errors were estimated.  The associated p-values are reported under each 
coefficient in the table.   
In TABLE 2.2, it is not possible to compare the effects of the data treatments to 
the unaltered sample so the columns pertaining to the unaltered sample have been 
intentionally left blank.  It is still possible to conclude that, given the censored dataset, 
the effect of endogeneity is still relatively small, which can be seen by comparing the 
price coefficients from columns (iii) and (ix), a difference of only 1.6%.  In addition, the 
difference between the coefficient estimates of the omitted- and censored-sample 
specifications is relatively large under both 2SLS and predicted sales methods, 
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suggesting the impact of the observations with super-unitary expected values is likely 
substantial in the P–EV model, although it is not directly testable in this framework.   
The results for the log-log model with p = P/EV are presented in TABLE 2.3.  In 
this model, the effective price coefficient estimates for Lotto Texas are interpreted as the 
price elasticity of an iso-elastic demand curve and are statistically significant at the 1% 
level in each of the regressions.  Comparison of the Lotto Texas price coefficient under 
column (i) with that under columns (iv) and (vi) shows the difference in the results from 
the two methods for controlling for endogeneity under the full, uncensored sample.  
Under two-stage least squares, the price coefficient is estimated to be -1.3606, which is 
3.2% larger in magnitude then uncontrolled estimate of -1.3187.  Using predicted sales 
to control for endogeneity results in a coefficient estimate of -1.3016, which is 1.3% 
smaller in magnitude than the uncontrolled estimate.  Both of these differences are 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
According to the data, the effect of censoring or dropping the observations with 
super-unitary expected values is much larger than that of failing to control for 
endogeneity.   The last three columns (vii – ix) show the results using the predicted sales 
method.  The effective price coefficient under the unaltered dataset is estimated to be            
-1.3016.  Omitting the super-unitary observations results in a coefficient estimate of        
-1.2009 (a 7.7% decrease in magnitude against the unaltered estimated), while censoring 
the observations results in a coefficient estimate of -1.4034 (a 7.8% increase in 
magnitude against the unaltered estimate).  These differences are also statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  Under 2SLS the effects of omitting and censoring the data 
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are even larger.  Under the unaltered sample, the coefficient estimate is -1.3606, which 
leads to a 9.2% decrease in magnitude if the observations are dropped (-1.2335) and a  
19.2% increase in magnitude if the observations are censored (-1.6225).  Clearly, the 
choice of how these observations are treated has a large impact on the results of the log-
log P/EV model. 
 The results for the semi-log approach are given in TABLE 2.4.  In this case the 
bias incurred from censoring (compared to the unaltered sample) is even larger, yielding 
differences of 14.4%, 20.4%, and 14.2% for the OLSact, 2SLS, and OLSpred models, 
respectively.  However, simply dropping the extreme observations only yields 
differences of 1.5%, 1.6%, and 1.7%, for the OLSact, 2SLS, and OLSpred models, 
respectively, when compared to the unaltered samples.  With the difference in the 
coefficients resulting from endogeneity amounting to only 0.3%, the semi-log model 
also provides compelling evidence the treatment of extreme observations is of more 
serious concern than endogeneity. 
 While the p-values reported for the Lotto Texas price coefficients in the three 
tables correspond to a statistical test against zero, it is more important to test whether the 
price elasticities are statistically different from their respective profit maximizing level.  
Expressions [2.16] and [2.19] provide the static profit maximization conditions for the 
producer and consumer approaches, respectively.  Expression [2.16] requires the 
elasticity of a model using A = P – EV to be -1 in order to be profit maximizing.  
According to the semi-log model under the unaltered sample using predicted sales to 
control for endogeneity (TABLE 2.4, column (ix) ), the estimated price elasticity of        
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-0.331 is statistically different from -1 at the 1% level with a p-value of 0.000.  
Similarly, expression [2.19] requires the elasticity of a model using p = P/EV to be         
-2.272.  This is derived by using the sales-weighted sample-mean expected value,    = 
0.560.  According to the log-log model under the unaltered sample using predicted sales 
to control for endogeneity (TABLE 2.3, column (ix) ), the estimated price elasticity of       
-1.4034 is statistically different from -2.272 at the 1% level with a p-value of 0.000.  
Both of these results indicate that the price of Lotto Texas is not optimal and should be 
raised to increase profits.  
However, the results of both of these tests for profit maximization are based upon 
estimates that are evaluated at the sample mean and are not necessarily valid at other 
points along the demand curve.  Therefore it may be necessary to evaluate the profit 
maximization condition at each point along the demand curve.  This can be done using 
the LOWESS regression analysis.  Under the effective price definition of P – EV, the 
estimated arc elasticities obtained using LOWESS are plotted in FIGURE 2.6.  The 
black dots denote the LOWESS smoothed arc elasticities computed at each point along 
the demand curve.  It is clear that the curve is everywhere inelastic relative to the profit 
maximizing value of -1.   FIGURE 2.7 provides a similar result when using the effective 
price definition of P/EV.  In this case the optimal elasticity varies along the demand 
curve as dictated by expression [2.19].  The LOWESS smoothed arc elasticities (denoted 
as black dots) are everywhere inelastic relative to the optimum. 
 
 
  
43 
 
FIGURE 2.6. Lotto Texas Arc Elasticities vs. Optimal Elasticities Derived from the Lottery  
Controller’s Static Profit Maximization Problem (A = P – EV) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.7. Lotto Texas Arc Elasticities vs. Optimal Elasticities Derived from the Lottery  
Controller’s Static Profit Maximization Problem (p = P/EV) 
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2.5  CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this essay was to re-examine the effective price model of lottery 
demand within a new framework that addresses several outstanding issues in the 
literature.  The predominant approach to modeling the demand for lottery tickets 
revolves around the use of an econometric framework where sales are regressed on a 
game’s effective price.  Estimation of this model in logarithms appears to provide a 
convenient way to obtain price elasticities, however the precise estimates are not entirely 
robust to either the definition of the effective price or the regression model specification.    
I have shown that the definition of A = P–EV is problematic given this 
framework due to rolling jackpots that can cause the expected value of a ticket to exceed 
the nominal value, requiring omission or censoring of the data if to still be estimated in 
logs.  I addressed this issue in two ways: (1) estimation of the price elasticity in a semi-
log framework, and (2) by proposing a new definition of the effective price, p = P/EV, 
that that is compatible under logarithmic transformations.  I also addressed the issue of 
the endogeneity of price using a unique set of sales predictions that enter into the 
effective price calculation directly, circumventing the need to estimate a two-stage 
model.  Finally, examine the use of a non-parametric regression technique to obtain 
estimates of a lottery game’s price elasticities along the entire demand curve.  The 
estimated price elasticities were then used to test whether Lotto Texas has effectively 
maximized profits. 
The results from the various modeling specifications provide compelling 
evidence that way observations with super-unitary expected values are treated in the 
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model can have a substantial impact on the estimated results.  In fact, according to the 
Lott Texas data, the bias incurred from failing to properly incorporate the extreme-
jackpot observations was six times the size of the bias incurred by failing to control for 
endogeneity.  Using a log-log model imposes an iso-elastic curvature restriction on the 
data.  Relaxing this restriction and estimating demand using local linear regression 
revealed that the demand curve is not iso-elastic, lending doubt to the validity of using 
elasticities evaluated at the sample mean to summarize price sensitivity over the entire 
demand curve.  Ultimately, the results from each of the demand models specified in this 
section indicated that Lotto Texas is not profit maximizing and can benefit substantially 
from a price increase. 
The methods described in this section exhibit a number of limitations.  First, this 
analysis investigates the demand behavior for a single game in isolation.  It is reasonable 
to suspect that price changes for competing products could have a considerable impact 
on the demand for Lotto Texas.  Since Texas operates multiple games concurrently 
within its portfolio, this situation would provide a logical extension to the analysis.  This 
particular issue will be explored in further detail in the following section.  Second, since 
the jackpots of lotto games are related intertemporally, static analysis of profitability will 
not effectively control for the effect a rollover may have on expected profits of future 
draws.  This topic will be addressed in Section 4.  Third, this study did not control for 
the potential effects of addictive behavior in relation to lottery gambling.  This topic has 
been addressed to some extent in the literature and it may be valuable to investigate the 
role of addiction within the context of the models presented in this section.   
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3.  DEMAND FOR LOTTERY GAMBLING: THE USE OF A DIFFERENTIAL 
DEMAND SYSTEM TO EVALUATE PRICE SENSITIVITY WITHIN A 
PORTFOLIO OF LOTTERY GAMES 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 In this essay, I build upon the methods described in Section 2 by extending the 
analysis to model lottery demand over an entire portfolio of lottery products.  It is rare to 
observe a lottery controller that operates a single game in isolation, motivating the need 
to examine, from a profitability perspective, how players respond to relative changes in 
the betting values of competing games.   
This analysis is important for three main reasons.  First, the ability to identify the 
degree to which games within a common portfolio are economic substitutes or 
complements of each other can help operators better market their products to consumers.  
For instance, if two games are estimated to be economic complements, then there may 
be potential gains in promoting one at the time of purchase of the other.  Second, 
assuming individuals have a fixed budget for lottery spending, then there arises the 
possibility of sales cannibalization among games that compete for a player’s dollar.  
Thus profit analysis must be conducted over the entire portfolio, maximizing the total 
amount of profit generated over all games, instead of maximizing the profit generated by 
each game individually.  Third, current methods in demand system analysis can provide 
both compensated and uncompensated price elasticities, expenditure elasticities, and 
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provides identification of demand parameters for games that exhibit no variation in the 
effective price. 
 The price elasticities estimated using the demand system can be used to measure 
the profitability of entire lottery portfolio.  The conditions for profit maximization are 
obtained by solving the lottery controllers objective function which subtracts total lottery 
payouts from total revenue earned from ticket sales.   
 
3.2  METHODOLOGY 
3.2.1  Barten’s Synthetic Demand System 
 In this study, own-price, cross-price, and expenditure elasticities are estimated 
using Barten’s (1993) synthetic differential demand system, which is a generalization of 
four commonly used specifications in demand analysis: the Rotterdam model (Barten 
1964;  Theil 1965;  Barnett 1979;  and Mountain 1988), the first-differenced Linear 
Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System  (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980), the (Dutch) 
Central Bureau of Statistics model (Keller and van Driel 1985), and the National Bureau 
of Research model (Neves 1987).  Barten’s synthesis combines the flexible functional 
form of the AIDS model with the econometric simplification of the differential systems.  
The model is both linear in its parameters (making it relatively easy to estimate) and 
allows for the first-differencing of variables to address issues of non-stationarity 
(Matsuda 2005). 
 To derive Barten’s demand system with respect to the games’ effective prices, I 
follow the notation in Matsuda (2005).  Let m be total expenditure on n games and let    
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p = (p1,…, pn) be a vector of effective prices defined according to expression [2.3] in the 
previous section.  Again, by defining the effective price in this manner, it allows the 
model to include observations with super-unitary expected values since Barten’s demand 
system also relies upon a logarithmic transformation of the games’ effective prices.  
Totally differentiating the effective Marshallian demand, qi(p,m), yields 
1
( , ) ( , )
( , ) , 1,...,
n
i i
i j
jj
q p m q p m
dq p m dm dp i n
m p

 
  
  . [3.1] 
By the Slutsky equation we get, 
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , )i i i j
j j
q p m h p u q p m
q p m
p p m
  
 
  
 [3.2] 
where hi(p,m) represents the Hicksian demand of game i. Finally, the budget constraint 
(adding-up condition), 
1
n
i i
i
m p q

 , is differentiated and algebraically rearranged to form 
1 1
n n
i i i i
i i
p dq dm q dp
 
   . [3.3] 
By substituting [3.2] into [3.1] with the aid of [3.3], then multiplying both sides by pi/m 
we get 
1
log log log
n
i ji i
i i i j
jj
p pq h
w d q p d Q d p
m m p

 
 
  . [3.4] 
On the right-hand side of this equation, 
logi iw d q  represents the log-change in effective quantity of game i, weighted by 
its respective expenditure share, i ii
p q
w
m
 .   
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On the left-hand side: 
i
i
q
p
m


 denotes the marginal expenditure share of game i and determines how 
additional expenditure to this game is allocated; 
log logi i
i
d Q w d q denotes the Divisia volume index number for changes in 
real income.  Note the use of the tilde on Q  is intended to differentiate 
this term from that used to denote the total tickets sales quantity, Q; and 
i j i
j
p p h
m p


 denotes the ijth element of the Slutsky matrix and pertains to the 
substitution effect between games i and j in response to a change in game 
j’s effective price (represented by log jd p ). 
In Barten’s model, i
i
q
p
m


 is assumed to equal 1( )i iw   and 
i j i
j
p p h
m p


 equals 
2 ( )ij i ij jw w    , resulting in the general form: 
1 2
1
log ( ) log ( ) log
n
i i i i ij i ij j j i
j
w d q w d Q w w d p     

         [3.5] 
where  1 11i i ib c     , is a vector of expenditure coefficients,  
 2 21ij ij ijs r      is a matrix of price coefficients, and μi is a stochastic error term.  
The estimated values for the parameters 1  and 2  allow the general model to be 
decomposed into the four aforementioned demand system specifications according 
TABLE 3.1. 
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TABLE 3.1. Barten Decomposition Parameters 
 
Model Parameter 
  δ1 δ2 
Rotterdam 0 0 
Linear Approx. Almost Ideal Demand System (LA-AIDS) 1 1 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 1 0 
National Bureau of Research (NBR) 0 1 
 
 
 
For 1 0   and 2 0  , the general model reduces to the Rotterdam model, or 
1
log log log
n
i i i ij j
j
w d q b d Q s d p

  , [3.6] 
which is one of the first and most commonly used differential demand systems. In this 
model, both the marginal expenditure share bi and the matrix of Stutsky parameters sij  
for each game are both assumed constant.  Although the model is relatively simple to 
estimate these assumptions are highly restrictive.  For 1 1   and 2 0  , we get the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) model,  
 
1
log log log
n
i i i i ij j
j
w d q c w d Q s d p

   , [3.7] 
which relaxes the restriction of constancy for the marginal expenditure shares by 
defining i i ic b w   and substituting for bi. Conversely, relaxing the constancy 
restriction on the Slutsky parameters sij yields the National Bureau of Research (NBR) 
model 
 
1
log log log
n
i i i ij i ij j j
j
w d q b d Q r w w d p

      , [3.8] 
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where  ij ij i ij jr s w w    with ij  denoting Kronecker’s delta, which is equal to 1 if 
i=j and 0 if i≠j.  This specification is obtained from [3.5] when 
1 0   and 2 1  .  
Relaxing both assumptions yields the differential Linear Approximate Almost Ideal 
Demand System (LA-AIDS) model 
   
1
log log log
n
i i i i ij i ij j j
j
w d q c w d Q r w w d p

       . [3.9] 
The AIDS was model originally developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) 
and uses a flexible functional form, which acts as a second-order approximation to the 
true indirect utility function.  While the AIDS specification is non-linear in its 
parameters (arising from its use of a translog price index), the “linearized approximate” 
AIDS model uses Stone’s (1953) linear price index to approximate the translog index.  
Expression [3.9] provides a first-differenced linear approximate AIDS specification that 
is obtained from [3.5] when 1 1   and 2 1  .  It is important to note that estimation 
using Barten’s synthesis does not impose any restrictions on the nesting parameters 1  
and 2 . Consequently, it is not necessary for the general model to fully reduce at all and 
can therefore be utilized as a demand system in and of itself (Brown 1994).   However, 
as pointed out by Matsuda (2005), the economic implications of 1 2&     outside the 
interval [0,1] seem to be unclear. 
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 The familiar demand restrictions for the general Barten model are given by 
10, 1   (Adding-up),ij i
i i
       [3.10] 
(Symmetry), &ij ji   [3.11] 
0   (Homogeneity).ij
j
   [3.12] 
These restrictions provide the model with consistency to economic theory and assist with 
parameter identification.  The procedure for estimating [3.5] requires the omission of a 
single equation, but the parameters can be recovered by imposing the demand 
restrictions.  This method is convenient for identifying the parameters for a game that 
exhibits no effective price variation since its corresponding equation can be the one 
omitted from the system. 
The expenditure elasticity of demand with respect to game i is given by 
1i i
i
i
w
e
w
 
  [3.13] 
and measures the responsiveness of demand to changes in expenditure on lottery games 
in general within the sample.  The uncompensated are compensated elasticities are 
21
( )ij i ij ji i
ij j
i i
w ww
w
w w
   

  
   
 
, [3.14] 
 2
ij
ij ij j
i
w
w

      [3.15] 
respectively. 
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3.2.2  Two-Stage Budgeting for Lottery Games 
 In reality, individuals’ lottery consumption patterns are inextricably linked to 
countless external factors such as the prices of all other consumable goods.  A complete 
analysis would be impossible; therefore it becomes necessary to impose simplifying 
assumptions on consumer preferences, particularly regarding how individuals allocate 
their budget for each good they purchase.  Edgerton (1997) describes the implications of 
two-stage budgeting on the estimation of price and expenditure elasticities for different 
groups of goods.  Under an assumption of two-stage budgeting, an individual’s 
allocation decision takes place in two independent steps.  First, total expenditure is 
allocated between m broad groups of goods.   Second, the expenditure on each group is 
then allocated among n elementary goods within each group (e.g. the first-stage 
budgeted amount for lottery gambling is then distributed among various games: Lotto 
Texas, Mega Millions, etc.).   
A necessary and sufficient condition for the second stage is that of weak 
separability of utility.  According to Pollock and Wales (1992), by assuming weak-
separability, the demand for a single lottery game can be expressed as a function of the 
prices of all the games within the lottery group and total expenditure on lottery as a 
whole.  This implies that expenditure and the prices of goods outside of the lottery group 
(i.e. food or clothing) enter the demand functions for lottery games only through their 
effect on total expenditure the lottery group.  Thus, since this analysis only deals with 
expenditure on lottery rather than total expenditure on all goods, the prices of all non-
lottery goods can be ignored, which mitigates the complexity of the problem.  The 
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assumption of weak separability is not unreasonably restrictive since one would not 
expect a change in the price of non-lottery goods to affect the relative marginal rates of 
substitution among various games within the lottery group. 
As discussed in Edgerton (1997), two-stage budgeting has important implications 
on the estimated price elasticities within the lottery group.  A change in the price of one 
game will have a direct effect on the quantities purchased within the lottery group as 
well as an indirect effect on the allocation of total lottery-group expenditure.  The effect 
of a change in the quantity of game i resulting from a change in the effective price of 
game j under two-stage budgeting is expressed mathematically as: 
 ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln
i i i
j j j
q h h X
p p X p
     
   
, [3.16] 
where hi is the Marshallian demand for game i, and X is total expenditure on the lottery 
group.  The term lnX can be decomposed into  
ln ln * ln *X Q P  , [3.17] 
where Q* represents aggregate demand and P* is the price index for the lottery group.  
Combining [3.17] with Stone’s (1953) price index, 
1
ln * ln
k
k k
n
P w p

 , [3.18] 
expression [3.16] becomes 
ln ln ln ln *ln * ln *
ln ln ln ln ln * ln
i i i
j j j j
q h h QP P
p p X p P p
               
. [3.19] 
Equation [3.19] can be expressed in elasticity form according to 
 1ij ij i ie w     , [3.20] 
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where ηij is the within-group uncompensated price elasticity of game i with respect to 
game j, ei is the within-group expenditure elasticity for game i, wi is the budget share for 
game i, and φ is the uncompensated price elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to 
the price index.  To summarize, ξij represents the uncompensated effective price 
elasticity adjusted to account for two-stage budgeting.  It is important to note that given 
the available data, obtaining the corresponding adjusted expenditure and compensated 
price elasticities is impossible since it would require total expenditure on all groups, 
which is unavailable.  Therefore only the adjusted uncompensated price elasticities are 
reported. 
 
3.2.3  Profit Maximization over a Portfolio of Games 
Analysis of a system of games requires the lottery controller’s objective function 
(see expression [2.18] in the previous section) to be summed over all games.  Thus the 
objective function over the portfolio becomes: 
    
1
max
i
N
i i i i i
p
i
p q p q p i N

    . [3.21] 
Taking the first-order conditions and simplifying yields: 
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Re-indexing the above expression we get 
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where x is total expenditure on all games, wi is the expenditure share for game i, and ξij is 
the Marshallian price elasticity of demand for game i with respect to game j.  This result 
indicates that the optimal profit depends not only upon the individual price elasticities of 
each game, but also their related cross-price elasticities and total expenditure.  
Furthermore, estimation of a point elasticity (e.g. evaluated at the mean) will require 
specification of mean measures of both the expenditure shares and the effective 
quantities of each game.  An important implication of expression [3.22] is that profit 
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maximization for the portfolio is not necessarily achieved when the own-price elasticity 
of each individual game is equal to -1. 
 
3.3  DATA 
Texas is an ideal candidate for studying lottery demand for a number of reasons.  
First, Texas has relatively few gaming substitutes to the lottery, making it an isolated 
market where the sales of lottery tickets are unlikely to be influenced by other gambling 
activities.  With the exception of six scattered racetracks and a lone Native American 
casino located in Eagle Pass at the border of Mexico, the lottery is virtually the only 
source of gambling available to public within the state of Texas3.4 Second, the vast 
majority of the population in the state is located on the interior, making the day-to-day 
cross-border shopping of lottery tickets a negligible issue.  Third, the variety of available 
on-line lottery games offered by the Texas Lottery lends itself aptly to the study of 
demand among games in portfolio. 
The data for this study were collected from public records provided by the Texas 
Lottery Commission and include daily sales, advertised jackpots, and odds at each prize 
tier for each of six games spanning April 2006 to year’s end 2009.  These games include 
Lotto Texas, Mega Millions, Texas Two Step, Cash Five, Pick 3, and Daily 4.  Each 
game offers a different bundle of characteristics, creating a portfolio that appears to be 
tailored to suit a wide array of risk tolerance among players.  These characteristics are 
                                                 
3 I acknowledge the fact that Texas’ neighboring states of Louisiana, Oklahoma, and New Mexico each 
have several gaming establishments that likely draw patronage of Texas residents.  However, I assume that 
expenditure on lottery is budgeted separately from that of out-of-state gambling and that market dynamics 
between the two are independent. 
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summarized using descriptive statistics in TABLE 3.2.  The number of drawings per 
week varies by game from twice a week to twice a day.  In order to properly compare 
data among the six games, sales were aggregated to the level of the least frequently 
drawn games (i.e.  twice a week).  Aggregation in this manner allows each draw period 
to include every game at least once, and splits the number of drawings of the more 
frequent games (such as Cash Five, Pick 3, and Daily) in half.  The actual draw dates are 
provided at the bottom of TABLE 3.2 and all the values in table are based on a half-
week draw period basis. 
All of the games in the sample were managed exclusively by the TLC with the 
exception of Mega Millions which was managed by a consortium of 12 states.  Total 
sales for each participating state were gathered over the time period in order to obtain 
Mega Million’s effective price.  Predicted sales data were not available for Mega 
Millions, but it is reasonable to assume that Texas players have a negligible impact on 
the total level of sales, and thus the magnitude of simultaneity bias is likely to be 
inconsequential.  Multi-state participation allows Mega Millions to offer jackpots at a 
much larger scale than any single-state lotto game, averaging $66 million over both time 
periods at an odds ratio of 1:175,711,536.  The long odds make Mega Millions the least 
generous of the games returning only 37 cents on average for every dollar bet.  Despite 
offering a jackpot that is on average 3.6 times higher than that of Lotto Texas, the two 
game’s average sales are very close in magnitude.  Lotto Texas is the flagship game for 
the TLC offering jackpots starting at $4 million and reaching up to $76 million.   
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TABLE 3.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Texas Lottery Portfolio 
         N = 385 Mean (μ) St. Dev. (σ) Min Max 
Ticket Sales 
   
  
Lotto Texas 2,106,588 491,836 1,377,250 4,208,545 
Mega Millions 2,206,366 1,467,058 1,134,096 16,500,000 
Texas Two Step 472,937 150,316 293,085 1,159,439 
Cash Five 250,323 42,895 134,978 380,351 
Pick 3 2,861,647 213,066 1,888,025 3,491,319 
Daily 4 527,649 94,656 331,838 1,158,071 
Top Prize 
   
  
Lotto Texas 17,220,779 14,533,925 4,000,000 76,000,000 
Mega Millions 62,130,208 57,809,074 12,000,000 370,000,000 
Texas Two Step 422,987 373,679 200,000 2,900,000 
Cash Five 27,459 3,286 17,217 36,261 
Pick 3 500 0 500 500 
Daily 4 5,000 0 5,000 5,000 
Expected Value (EV) 
  
  
Lotto Texas 0.48 0.33 0.17 1.86 
Mega Millions 0.37 0.15 0.22 0.96 
Texas Two Step 0.46 0.16 0.36 1.50 
Cash Five 0.41 0.004 0.40 0.42 
Pick 3 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 
Daily 4 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 
Effective Price (P/EV) 
  
  
Lotto Texas 2.81 1.35 0.54 5.81 
Mega Millions 3.13 1.03 1.05 4.59 
Texas Two Step 2.34 0.51 0.69 2..81 
Cash Five 2.43 0.03 2.36 2.50 
Pick 3 2.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 
Daily 4 2.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 
 
Odds 
 
Draw Dates   
Lotto Texas 1:25,827,165   Wed & Sat   
Mega Millions 1:175,711,536 
 
Tues & Fri   
Texas Two Step 1:1,832,600  Mon & Thu   
Cash Five 1:435,897 
 
Mon-Sat   
Pick 3 1:1,000  Twice Daily (except Sunday)  
Daily 4 1:5,000   Twice Daily (except Sunday)  
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Sales per drawing fall within the range of 1.37 million to 4.2 million over the 
sample period with an average of 2.1 million.  Lotto Texas has the highest variation in 
effective price among all the other games ranging from $.54 to $5.82.  Texas Two Step 
is structured very similarly to Lotto Texas, though at a smaller scale with jackpots 
ranging from $200,000 to $2.9 million at odds of 1:1,832,600.  Even though it offers 
more favorable odds, its lower jackpots do not appear to appeal as well to the public, 
generating sales of only about a fifth in magnitude to Lotto Texas. 
Lotto Texas, Mega Millions, and Texas Two Step are designed according to the 
traditional lotto format with base jackpots that grow as rollovers accrue.  The remaining 
three games follow different formats.  In Cash Five, players choose five numbers from a 
field of 37 with prizes awarded for matching 2, 3, 4, or 5 numbers correctly, with 
drawings occurring once a day except on Sundays.  In order to determine the value of 
each prize, all of lowest tier prizes ($2 for matching two numbers correctly) are paid out 
first, since this is a guaranteed prize.  Once the total amount of $2 prizes has been 
subtracted from the prize pool, the residual is then allocated among the remaining prize 
tiers, with 40.15%, 18.08%, and 41.77% going to the first-, second-, and third-tier prizes, 
respectively.  These prizes are then split among all winners in a pari-mutuel fashion.  On 
average, the top prize amounts to about $27,500 at odds of 1:435,897.  The mean 
effective price in the sample is 2.43, making Cash 5 cheaper to play than Texas Lotto or 
Mega Millions, on average. 
Pick 3 is a small-scale game offering a top prize of only $500 with no rollovers.  
In Pick 3 a player chooses three single-digit numbers from 0 to 9 where bets are placed 
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on the particular permutation of numbers chosen.  For instance, one may play their 
numbers in exact order, any order, or both.  All the prizes are fixed and computed in 
direct proportion to the odds of matching the chosen numbers.  Pick 3 is the most 
popular on-line game in the portfolio boasting sales of 2 million tickets per drawing, on 
average, with drawings occurring twice a day (morning and night).  It also is the least 
expensive game in the portfolio to play, at a fixed effective price of $2.00. 
Added to the portfolio on October 1, 2007, Daily 4 is almost identical to Pick 3 
except that players choose four single-digits from 0 to 9.  This addition increases the 
scale of the game (in terms of odds and prize amounts) by ten and provides players with 
more available permutations by which to play their numbers.  It appears that the lottery 
operator’s intent of adding Daily 4 to the portfolio was to bridge the risk gap between 
Pick 3 and Cash Five, creating a game that only differs from Pick 3 by it scale.  In its 
first month, sales of Daily 4 surged above those of Texas Two Step and Cash Five, but 
quickly fell to an equilibrium level of around 520,000 per draw period.  Compared to 
Pick 3, Daily 4’s poor ticket sales is not surprising considering that its design was likely 
tailored to a niche group of players with a slightly higher degree of risk tolerance.   
In FIGURE 3.1, total sales of each of the six games by drawing are plotted.  This 
figure clearly illustrates the relative magnitudes and variability of sales among the 
games.  Texas lotto tends to perform better than Mega Millions in any given draw 
period, except where the Mega Millions jackpot is relatively high.  In these drawings the 
sales of Mega Millions tickets rise very sharply as depicted by the tall peaks.  Sales for 
Cash 5 and Daily 4 are relatively flat. 
  
62 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1. Texas Lottery Ticket Sales by Game 
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The effective prices of Pick 3 and Daily 4 do not vary.  In order to identify the 
parameters used for computing the elasticities of these two games, I take advantage of 
the parameter restrictions of the Barten demand system (i.e. adding-up, homogeneity, 
and symmetry).  Due to the fact that both of the games exhibit no price variation, it 
would be impossible to identify their parameters separately.  As a result, I have chosen 
to lump them together and enter them into the model in the form of a composite game.  
However, their extreme similarity in design makes analyzing them as a composite a 
reasonable approach. 
 
3.4  RESULTS 
Using a differential demand system model to analyze lottery demand is 
advantageous in a number of ways.  First, the model’s demand parameters are easily 
combined to provide estimates of expenditure and price elasticities (both compensated 
and uncompensated) at any point along the demand curve.  Second, using a formal 
demand system can provide results that are consistent with utility maximization.  Third, 
the model controls for changes in expenditure levels on games in response to the indirect 
effects of price changes on the aggregate price index.  Fourth, imposing demand 
restrictions can be used to identify games with little to no price variation. Fifth, the 
process of first-differencing variables in the model is likely to make them stationary.  
The model was estimated using a non-linear Seemingly Unrelated Regression procedure 
available in the STATA statistical software package. 
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In order to control for first-order serial correlation in the data, the demand system 
can be estimated in the form of an AR(1) process (Yuan, Capps, and Nayga 2009). This 
adjustment was accomplished by adding a one-period lag term for both the right-hand 
side and left-hand side of equation [3.5].  It is necessary to estimate a common AR(1) 
coefficient among each of the equations in order to ensure that the adding-up restriction 
holds. The coefficient is estimated to be -.568 with a p-value of 0.000, which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  The Barten decomposition parameter estimates 
(and p-values), δ1 and δ2, are estimated to be -.205 (.206) and -0.016 (0.941).  The χ2 
statistics of the tests for the four hypothesized functional forms are given in TABLE 3.3.  
According to the four tests, only the Rotterdam model fails to reject its corresponding 
null hypothesis, suggesting that the data appear to fit the Rotterdam specification. 
 
TABLE 3.3. Hypothesis Tests for Four Models 
 
Null Hypothesis 
 
Chi-sq(2)   P-value 
(Rotterdam) δ1 = 0 δ2 = 0 
 
3.82 
 
0.148 
(LA-AIDS) δ1 = 1 δ2 = 1   35.04   0.000 
(CBS) δ1 = 1 δ2 = 0 
 
142.27 
 
0.000 
(NBR) δ1 = 0 δ2 = 1   59.4   0.000 
 
 
Price and expenditure elasticities derived from the Barten estimation procedure 
are provided in TABLE 3.4.  It is important to note that the results reported in this table 
represent the within-group elasticities, which do not incorporate the indirect effect of 
price change on total group expenditure.  The expenditure elasticities vary widely across 
the Texas games.  Lotto Texas and the Pick3/Daily 4 composite both exhibit sub-unitary  
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TABLE 3.4. Barten Synthetic Demand System Price and Expenditure Elasticity Estimates  
 
Uncompensated Price Elasticities       
n = 385 Price 
Lotto Texas Mega Mil Two Step Cash 5 Composite 
Q
u
a
n
ti
ty
 
Lotto Texas -1.096 
0.190 0.285 0.049 -0.171 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mega Mil 
0.009 -1.708 0.505 0.085 -0.380 
0.754 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Two Step 
0.304 1.485 -6.294 0.538 -0.979 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cash 5 
0.045 0.320 0.512 -3.015 1.034 
0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.065 
Composite 
0.006 0.045 0.104 0.346 -0.549 
0.489 0.061 0.000 0.015 0.003 
  
     
  
Compensated Price Elasticities 
   
  
  Price 
Lotto Texas Mega Mil Two Step Cash 5 Composite 
Q
u
a
n
ti
ty
 
Lotto Texas -0.906 
0.371 0.324 0.118 0.093 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Mega Mil 
0.389 -1.345 0.584 0.222 0.151 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Two Step 
1.568 2.689 -6.033 0.992 0.784 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cash 5 
0.327 0.589 0.571 -2.914 1.427 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 
Composite 
0.067 0.103 0.116 0.368 -0.464 
0.001 0.003 0.000 0.010 0.009 
  
 
    
  
Expenditure Elasticities 
   
  
  
 
Lotto Texas Mega Mil Two Step Cash 5 Composite 
   0.743 1.489 4.945 1.102 0.240 
    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P-values are reported under each coefficient estimate 
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elasticity expenditure estimates, suggesting relatively low sensitivity to changes in 
expenditure levels.  Mega Millions, Texas Two Step, and Cash 5 each report magnitudes 
above one, indicating a higher degree of sensitivity.  These results suggest that as Texas 
players’ budgets for lottery gambling change, they tend to remain relatively less loyal to 
Lotto Texas and Pick3/Daily4, on average. 
The models presented in earlier studies that estimate price elasticities all report 
uncompensated measures, which incorporate income and substitution effects 
simultaneously.  The estimates of the uncompensated Barten price elasticities, evaluated 
at the sample means for each game are also reported in TABLE 3.4.  Own-price 
elasticities are marked in bold along the diagonal of the matrix.  Each game exhibits 
elastic demand with the exception of the composite, which yields an inelastic own-price 
estimate.  These estimates are all statistically significant at the 1% level.  Texas Two 
Step and Cash 5 exhibit the greatest sensitivity to changes in their own respective 
effective prices, with the large magnitude for Texas Two Step’s own-price elasticity 
likely due, in large part, to its relatively low budget share.  This argument could also be 
made to explain the large value of Texas Two Step’s expenditure elasticity as well. 
The uncompensated cross-price elasticity estimates give insight into the degree 
of substitutability between games in the face of income effects.  These values are 
reported in the off-diagonal cells in the table.  Most of the cross-price terms are positive, 
suggesting that most of the games are gross substitutes for one another.  The only 
negative cross-price values appear in the composite column.   The table also reports the 
compensated elasticity matrix, which measures the pure substitution effects net of any 
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income effects.  These estimates exhibit a much larger degree of substitution among all 
five games. In fact, all games are net substitutes of each other at the mean and each 
estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
TABLE 3.5 reports the adjusted uncompensated price elasticities, which 
incorporate the indirect effect of price changes on total group expenditure under two-
stage budgeting.  The most important things to note are that each of the own-price 
elasticities is slightly higher in magnitude and that signs of each of the cross-price 
elasticities in the first column have reversed.   
 
TABLE 3.5. Barten Uncompensated Price Elasticities Adjusted for Two-Stage Budgeting 
 
n = 385 Price 
Lotto Texas Mega Mil Two Step Cash 5 Composite 
Q
u
a
n
ti
ty
 
Lotto Texas -1.229 0.063 0.257 0.001 -0.358 
 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.926 0.000 
Mega Mil -0.259 -1.963 0.450 -0.011 -0.754 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.701 0.000 
Two Step -0.587 0.637 -6.478 0.218 -2.221 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.000 
Cash 5 -0.153 0.131 0.471 -3.086 0.757 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.181 
Composite -0.037 0.003 0.095 0.330 -0.609 
  0.000 0.838 0.000 0.021 0.002 
P-values are reported under each coefficient estimate 
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As demonstrated in Section 3.2, the total profit is maximized if the condition 
expressed in [3.22] holds.  Using the values estimated in the Barten demand yields a 
value of -0.829.  Testing the hypothesis that this value is equal to -1 results in a Chi-
squared statistic (df = 1) of 258.01 with is statistically significant at the 1% level.  This 
results leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis, providing strong evidence that the 
Texas Lottery’s portfolio is not maximizing total average profit.  This is most likely due 
in part to the substitutionary relationship between the games, whereby a substantial 
degree of sales cannibalization is occurring. 
 
3.5  CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this study was to develop a model for lottery demand that controls for 
the direct cross-price effects of competing lottery games within a state’s portfolio and 
examine whether the portfolio’s pricing scheme leads to optimal profits.  It offers a 
number of methodological contributions to the literature.  First, it continues the work of 
developed in Section 2 by using an alternative effective price approach to model demand 
for several games from the perspective of consumers, thereby defining the effective price 
to be p = P/EV allows for unrestricted use of observations with super-unitary expected 
values.  Second, demand elasticities are estimated using a formal demand system, which 
is not only consistent with the theory of utility maximization, but allows estimation 
expenditure elasticities, both compensated and uncompensated own- and cross-price 
elasticities as well as provide identification for games that exhibit no price variation.  
Third, elasticity estimates are used to evaluate whether the portfolio’s profits are 
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maximized over all games.  The major results of estimating the Barten demand system 
provide strong evidence that games within Texas’ portfolio are all net substitutes of one 
another and mostly gross substitutes as well.  Evaluating the profit maximization 
problem of the Texas Lottery reveals evidence that the games are not optimally priced, 
leading to sub-optimal profits over the sample period. This results is particularly 
interesting when considering the findings of previous studies.  The models developed by 
Forrest, Gulley, and Simmons (2004), and Perez and Forrest (2010) report small and 
statistically insignificant cross-price estimates, suggesting that competing games tend to 
be largely independent of one another.  Both Grote and Matheson (2006), and Purfield 
and Waldron (1999) report findings that suggest a slight complementary relationship 
between closely competing games. 
 The findings in this study also have important policy implications.  First and 
foremost is that lottery games compete with each other and players are sensitive to 
relative price differences within a lottery market.  This is result is critical for any lottery 
jurisdiction considering either altering the rules of existing games, adding new games to 
their portfolio, or joining a multi-state consortium.  With such a large amount of money 
being generated through the sales lottery tickets, pricing policies based upon imprecise 
estimates of demand can likely lead to sizable losses in potential revenue.  Cross-price 
effects matter, therefore analysis of profits based upon elasticity estimates obtained from 
modeling games in isolation is likely to be heavily biased.  The result that profits are not 
maximized suggests that lottery portfolio operators may very well stand to benefit from 
re-evaluating their product mix and pricing.   
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Unfortunately, the elasticities estimated in this study only provide a piece of the 
complete dynamic system created by these repeatedly played games.  Much of the how 
these games interact under different circumstances is not largely understood.  
Determining the best way to improve a portfolio’s pricing scheme is not an easy task.  
With limitations in available data, potential policy changes would likely need to be 
simulated in order to better understand the how profits streams can be increased.  The 
development of a formal approach to address this issue is discussed in the following 
section. 
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4.  IMPROVING PROFIT STREAMS OF STATE LOTTERIES THROUGH 
DYNAMIC EFFECTIVE-PRICE ANALYSIS 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
In this essay I develop a new method to analyze the profitability of different 
pricing schemes that explicitly accounts for the intertemporal nature of lottery games 
that include the rollover of unclaimed jackpots.  Previous work treats the profit 
maximization problem of the lottery controller in a static framework so that changes in 
price only influence profitability through their effect on period-by-period sales and 
expected payouts.  This situation neglects, however, that changes in the probability that a 
jackpot is won influences the probability of reaching new drawings with higher jackpot 
amounts.  For example, suppose that demand for a lotto game is inelastic at current 
prices, expected profitability of a given drawing decreases with jackpot size, and 
rollovers cause the subsequent jackpot to increase when there is no winning draw. An 
increase in the price of the game would increase first-period profit, but would also 
decrease total sales and thus increase the probability of reaching a drawing with a higher 
jackpot in the second period. Since expected profitability is decreasing in jackpot size, it 
is possible for the expected gain in first-period profit from increasing price to be 
partially offset by the decrease in expected second-period profit because the probability 
of reaching a drawing with lower expected profit has increased.  
Thus, while there is little cost in viewing lotteries as repeated static games from 
the perspective of players, the problem of profit maximization is clearly connected 
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intertemporally because of rollovers. Intuitively, the more the jackpot is rolled over, the 
higher the ticket sales, but the more the resulting payouts will be when the jackpot is 
eventually claimed.  Because this issue cannot be directly addressed in a static 
framework, I utilize a Monte Carlo integration procedure to obtain a measure of 
expected profit through the simulation of lottery play over a period of four years.  Such a 
procedure also provides a way to examine the effects of hypothetical changes in a 
game’s pricing on total profits earned by the lottery controller. 
The quality of this analysis depends entirely on the quality of information about 
the demand relationship for lotto games. Thus, in estimating the relationship between the 
price of lotto games and sales, which is used in the Monte Carlo simulation procedure, I 
incorporate the three innovations discussed in Section 2 of redefining the effective price 
to allow the inclusion of observations with super-unitary expected values, solving the 
problem of endogenous price by calculating the expected values using expected sales 
data, and estimating the demand curve using non-parametric local linear regression to 
avoid imposing the curvature restriction of iso-elasticity. 
 
4.2  METHODOLOGY 
The previous two sections describe the methodology for deriving the lottery 
controllers static maximization problem.  While the consumer sees the lottery a repeated 
one-shot game, the lottery controller wishes to maximize a stream of profits over an 
extended period of time, where the expected profits in each period are related 
intertemporally. According to the static calculus, nothing matters beyond the period at 
  
73 
hand, but in reality if a winner is not manifest then the lottery’s payout obligation is not 
eliminated, but merely postponed one period.  Therefore there is a cost of moving to the 
next period, in terms of a slightly larger payout, that must be weighed against the 
alternative state of having a winner chosen in the present period.  While the realization 
of a winner in any given period is not a choice variable (but randomly determined), the 
lottery controller can influence how far the game tends to play out indirectly through its 
choice of the odds, takeout rate, and nominal price.  In order to model the intertemporal 
costs and benefits of rolling jackpots, profit analysis should be conducted in a dynamic 
framework. 
Further motivation to support a dynamic model is given by the added possibility 
of analyzing hypothetical policy changes.  In addition to answering the question of “in 
which direction?” should prices change to increase profit, a dynamic model can provide 
insight into answering the question of “by how much?”.  A lottery controller has control 
over five different methods to alter the effective price of a lotto bet, which include 
changing the nominal ticket price, the odds of winning each prize tier, the specific 
amounts allocated to fund each prize tier, the number of prize tiers offered, and how to 
manage period-by-period rollovers.  Each potential policy change will affect the 
outcome of a series of drawings in different ways.  For example, effective April 26, 2006 
the official rules for Lotto Texas were changed in three different directions in an attempt 
to increase ticket sales.  First, the game moved from a double draw matrix of 5-of-44 and 
1-of-44 to a single matrix of 6-of-54, effectively increasing the odds of winning the 
jackpot from 1:47,784,352 to 1:25,827,165.  Second, it reduced the number of lower-tier 
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prizes from 7 to 3.  Third, the way the method for funding the prizes was restructured.  
Before the rule change, a percentage of Lotto Texas ticket sales were allocated to a 
general prize pool.  Then percentages of this prize pool were then sub-allocated to each 
prize level, respectively.  Currently (post rule change) the funds allocated to each prize 
level are directly a percentage of total ticket sales and allows the Texas Lottery 
Commission to use proceeds from other games to fund Lotto Texas prizes. 
To illustrate the effects of this rule change on the Lotto Texas demand curve, 
effective prices and quantities are plotted for both time periods in FIGURE 4.1.  The 
black squares provide the effective price/quantity relationship before the new rules were 
implemented and the gray diamonds denote the demand relationship under the new rules.  
There is a clear downward shift in the demand curve, demonstrating that altering the 
rules of the game can have a substantial impact on the demand relationship. 
Since the extreme rarity of observable policy changes to a lottery game renders 
direct econometric analysis impossible, I propose the use of Monte Carlo integration 
methods to aid in the development of a dynamic model that simulates lottery play under 
a pre-determined set of rules over the course of several years.  Then price parameters can 
then be adjusted to simulate hypothetical changes in the game’s rules to model how 
individuals’ ticket purchasing behavior would respond.  Total simulated profits can be 
computed under the various policy changes and compared. 
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FIGURE 4.1. Lotto Texas Rule-Change-Induced Demand Curve Shift 
 
Although this study is primarily concerned with the game Lotto Texas from an 
empirical standpoint, the methods discussed can be easily adapted to suit the specific 
characteristics of any lotto-style game.  At its heart, the Monte Carlo procedure 
simulates 416 independent lottery drawings, which amount to 4 years of play at a rate of 
two drawings per week.  This 4-year trial is then repeated 500 times with the total 
simulated profits from each trial averaged together to obtain a mean representative value.  
This method directly takes the static modeling techniques discussed above and applies 
them in a dynamic framework to capture the intertemporal cost of allowing the jackpot 
to be rolled over into future periods.  Simulating lottery play not only provides a direct 
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estimate of total profits, but also allows the analysis of hypothetical policy changes to 
examine whether profit streams can be increased. 
 First the initial values are chosen.  For Lotto Texas, a roll cycle always begins 
with an advertised jackpot of $4,000,000, which provides a natural starting point to run 
the procedure.  Since the simulation will run for exactly four years of lottery play, each 
trial is timed to begin in the month of January. 
Second, the ex ante sales predictions are modeled according to a regression of 
Lotto Texas’ total sales on the jackpot, month dummies, and jackpot/month interaction 
terms.  The estimates were adjusted for first-order serial correlation using a Prais-
Winsten regression with a Cochran-Orcutt transformation made available in the STATA 
statistical software package.  The parameter estimates are provided in TABLE 4.1.  The 
actual ticket sales prediction formula used by the TLC not publicly available so this 
formula has to be approximated.  The month dummies are included to simulate seasonal 
variation in ticket sales. The predicted values of this regression enter into the calculation 
of the ex ante expected value along with the prize amounts and the respective 
probabilities of winning these prizes according to expression [2.11] in Section 2.  The 
expected value is then converted to the effective price according to expression [2.3] in 
Section 2.   
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TABLE 4.1. Sales Prediction Regression Parameter Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable:  Ticket Sales   
N = 385 R-sq = .8764  D-W = 2.606   
Independent Variables:     
jackpot 0.0263 const. 1,616,923 
0.000 0.000 
jan 26,961.68 jan_int -0.0013 
0.736 0.788 
feb -52,602.11 feb_int 0.0057 
0.549 0.157 
mar -20,198.07 mar_int 0.0095 
0.745 0.004 
apr 27,851.74 apr_int 0.0047 
0.621 0.169 
may  231,240.10 may_int -0.0168 
0.005 0.026 
jun -83,702.61 jun_int 0.0070 
0.273 0.186 
jul 162,131.80 jul_int  -0.0114 
0.020 0.011 
aug -44,880.80 aug_int 0.0025 
0.546 0.510 
sep -29,766.23 sep_int 0.0070 
0.603 0.035 
oct -34,945.95 oct_int 0.0035 
0.534 0.279 
nov 65,523.00 nov_int -0.0043 
0.346 0.376 
P-values are reported under each coefficient estimate 
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Third, ex post actual sales are obtained from the fitted values of a non-parametric 
LOWESS regression of log-effective sales on log-effective price.  More specifically, the 
LOWESS estimation provides a grid of price/quantity pairs, so given a value for the ex 
ante effective price in the simulation, the procedure finds the closest matching price 
value in the LOWESS grid and assigns the corresponding fitted quantity, from which the 
ex post total ticket sales can be obtained.  It is important to note that the LOWESS fitted 
values can only be obtained for prices within the observable range.  Since the random 
assignment of values from the uniform distribution could potentially lead to longer 
strings of simulated rollovers than is actually observed in the underlying data sample, 
some extrapolation is necessary.  For example, in the Lotto Texas data sample the 
longest string of rollovers was 47 draw periods, resulting in the lowest observed 
effective price of $0.54.  Running the simulation under 500 trials will likely result in 
strings of rollovers greater than 47, resulting in prices with no matching LOWESS fitted 
values for quantity.   
In order to solve this problem, I chose to extrapolate linearly beyond the two 
ends of the Lotto Texas demand curve, as illustrated in FIGURE 4.2.  Effective quantity 
is linearly regressed on effective price using two separate subsamples at the tails of the 
demand curve.  The slope coefficient is used to extend the quantity prediction for any 
simulated points beyond the observable range.  Because I re-evaluate the integration 
under various hypothetical nominal prices, a greater number of simulated points will 
need to be extrapolated.  As a result, I feel comfortable only allowing a maximum of 
10% of the simulated points to extend beyond the observable range. 
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FIGURE 4.2. Linear Extrapolation of the Ends of the Lotto Texas Demand Curve 
 
 
 
Fourth, once total sales have been determined it becomes necessary to establish 
the transition into the next period.  This situation will result in two potential states: (1) 
the jackpot is won and reset to $4 million, or (2) the jackpot is not won and consequently 
rolled over.  In reality, the realization of a winning ticket for any given drawing is 
determined by the matching of a player’s chosen numbers to the official randomly-
drawn numbered balls.  Operating under the assumption that the numbers players choose 
are uniformly distributed across the set of all players, Farrell, Morgenroth, and Walker 
(1999) point out that the probability α of a rollover for a m-of-n game, given total ticket 
sales N can be modeled by 
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Therefore in order to simulate the potential for a rollover in a given drawing, α is 
computed according to [4.1] and then compared to a randomly drawn value obtained 
from a uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1], call λ.  If α > λ , the jackpot is won 
and reset to the base, while payouts for lower-tier prizes are assigned according to their 
the size of their prize pools.    If α < λ, then a rollover is triggered and the new jackpot 
must be determined.  According to the official rules for Lotto Texas, the jackpot prize 
must be the greater of: (1) 40.47% of the proceeds from Lotto Texas ticket sales and any 
earnings on an investment of all or part of the proceeds from tickets sales, paid in annual 
installments; or (2) the amount advertised, paid in 25 annual installments. 
In practice, the advertised jackpot for Lotto Texas exceeds 40.47% of total 
tickets sales due in part to stochastic variation, but also by the TLC’s option to fund the 
Lotto Texas jackpot using outsides sources, most likely exercised to attract higher-than-
normal ticket sales.  Clause 1 is a less-generous approach and provides a lower (upper) 
bound on the jackpots paid out (profits brought in).  Similarly, Clause 2 is more 
generous to players and provides an upper (lower) bound on the jackpots paid out 
(profits brought in).  The simulation is run under both rollover policies to provide a 
range of feasible values.  It is important to note that because earnings on investment are 
impossible to determine without intimate knowledge of the TLC’s investment strategies, 
I assume that the amount added to the previous period’s jackpot can be determined by 
calculating 40.47% of sales and rounding to the nearest $1 million.  The TLC has always 
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rounded to the nearest million in their own practice so I argue that my approximation is a 
reasonable approach.  The payouts for the lower-tier prizes are awarded regardless of 
whether the jackpot is rolled.  The second- and third-tier prizes are pari-mutuel, with 
respective prize pools of 2.23% and 3.28% of sales.  The fourth-tier prize is a guaranteed 
$3, so the simulated prize payout at this tier is simply the prize amount multiplied by the 
probability of winning multiplied by the total number of sales. Finally, total payouts are 
subtracted from the total ticket revenue for each drawing.  The resulting profit then is 
summed over each of the 500 trials and averaged together to obtain an estimate of four 
years worth of total profits.   
Unfortunately the Lotto Texas data are limited in their ability to provide 
information that will aid the analysis of hypothetical changes in the lotteries operational 
policy.  According to the effective price model, the observed variation in the effective 
price caused by rollovers only indentifies movement along the demand curve and 
provides nothing to help identify potential shifts in demand.  Even using the results of 
the 2006 rule change in the form of a natural experiment would not be of much use since 
the rule change itself was multi-faceted and it is impossible to separately identify the 
individual effects of each piece.  However, this situation does not prevent further 
exploration of potential improvements in profitability as a result of policy changes that 
affect positioning along the demand curve.   
 The demand curve of a lotto game is quite asymmetric.  Most observations occur 
near the base jackpot since it is to this point that the game always resets following a 
winning draw.  In this region, the number of tickets sales is low, but the expected profit 
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per ticket is high.  On the other side, we observe a lower effective price with much fewer 
observations, but the number of sales is much higher.  Since the two sides of the demand 
curve are considerably different, it is possible to force the game to play out more 
frequently to one side or the other, potentially resulting in higher profit streams.  
Essentially this can be accomplished by altering the pricing of the game to impose 
movement along the curve en masse.  The most straightforward approach is to simulate 
changes in the nominal price of a ticket.  Altering the nominal price of a ticket imposes 
two separate effects on the profitability of the game.  First is a direct effect on the 
effective price of a bet according (see expression [2.3]), which causes the game to play 
out along a different section of the demand curve.  Second is an indirect effect on the 
distribution of jackpots the lottery controller will ultimately pay out.  Changing the 
effective price of a ticket will impact total sales, which in-turn impacts the probability 
that a jackpot is won, which in-turn influences the probability of reaching new drawings 
with higher jackpot amounts.  Static profit analysis does not provide a pathway to 
explore this indirect effect, further supporting the need to employ dynamic methods. 
 
4.3  DATA 
The data for this study were collected from public records provided by the Texas 
Lottery Commission (TLC) and include daily sales, advertised jackpots, and odds at 
each prize tier for the games Lotto Texas spanning April 2006 to year’s end 2009.  This 
information was also collected for the games Texas Two Step and Mega Millions, which 
are also offered by the TLC with effective prices that enter the model as a control for 
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competing games.  Since the data used in this study are identical to those used described 
in Section 2, the reader is invited to refer to TABLE 2.1 as well as the corresponding 
description.   
 
4.4  RESULTS 
The results for the Monte Carlo procedure are provided in TABLE 4.2, total 
simulated profits were obtained under nominal prices ranging from $0.70 to $1.40 in 
increments of $0.10 for two separate rollover schemes. The bounds set on the nominal 
price change correspond to the extrapolation restriction requiring less than 10% of 
simulated points to fall outside of the observable price range.  Changing the nominal 
price makes a suitable policy option to analyze because it has a direct effect on the 
effective price of a ticket, inducing movement along the demand curve.  Lotto Texas 
currently is nominally priced at $1, which provides a benchmark for comparison.  
According to TABLE 4.2, a price of $1.00, the total number of tickets sold range from 
1.04 billion to 1.06 billion, depending on the level of generosity of the rollover policy.  
Also at this price, profits (i.e. revenue net of payouts) amount between $566 million to 
$665 million over the course of four years, or a takeout rate range of 53.2% to 64.0%.  
With the number of actual Lotto Texas tickets sold by the TLC in 2010 amounting to 
256 million, the simulated average of approximately 263 million tickets per year appears 
to be quite reasonable in magnitude, lending support to the predictive power of the 
simulation model. 
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Simulated changes in the nominal price reveal a monotonic increase (decrease) in 
total profit as the nominal price rises (falls). This result suggests that according to the 
Monte Carlo procedure, elasticity of total profit with respect to the sales is inelastic over 
the simulated nominal price range.  Thus a hypothetical increase in the nominal ticket 
price of $0.40 is estimated to result in a total increase in profit ranging from $142 
million to $191 million.  In percentage terms, 40% increase in the nominal price is 
estimated to resulting in a percentage profit increase of 25% to 29%, again depending on 
level of rollover generosity.   To put this value into perspective, according to the Texas 
Comptroller of Public Accounts, the total budget for education in Texas was $57.9 
billion for the 2008-2009 school year.  Proceeds from the Texas Lottery contributed to 
1.7% of the budget, or $984 million.  This result indicates that a price increase of $0.40 
from this one lottery game alone would provide a 3.6% - 4.8% increase in lottery’s total 
contributions to Texas’ education fund. 
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TABLE 4.2. Results of Simulation over Various Nominal Prices 
 
Duration: 416 periods (4 years), Trials: 500           
METHOD 1 - Rollovers computed as 40.47% of proceeds from Lotto Texas Ticket Sales  (More conservative rollovers) 
  Nominal Price Tickets Sold Revenue Profit 
Takeout 
Rate 
Δ in Profit 
($1.00 base) 
%Δ in Sales 
($1.00 base) 
%Δ in Profit 
($1.00 base) 
  $0.70 1,191,400,000 $834,000,000 $481,900,000 57.8% -$182,900,000 14.7% -27.5% 
  $0.80 1,130,200,000 $904,130,000 $544,900,000 60.3% -$119,900,000 8.8% -18.0% 
  $0.90 1,080,400,000 $972,350,000 $605,800,000 62.3% -$59,000,000 4.0% -8.9% 
  $1.00 1,039,100,000 $1,039,100,000 $664,800,000 64.0% --- --- --- 
  $1.10 1,003,500,000 $1,103,800,000 $715,040,000 64.8% $50,240,000 -3.4% 7.6% 
  $1.20 972,830,000 $1,167,400,000 $759,380,000 65.0% $94,580,000 -6.4% 14.2% 
  $1.30 946,860,000 $1,230,900,000 $807,060,000 65.6% $142,260,000 -8.9% 21.4% 
  $1.40 925,430,000 $1,295,600,000 $855,570,000 66.0% $190,770,000 -10.9% 28.7% 
  
       
  
METHOD 2 - Rollovers computed based upon estimates of Lotto Texas' common practice  (More generous rollovers) 
  Nominal Price Tickets Sold Revenue Profit 
Takeout 
Rate 
Δ in Profit 
($1.00 base) 
%Δ in Sales 
($1.00 base) 
%Δ in Profit 
($1.00 base) 
  $0.70 1,204,000,000 $842,810,000 $437,410,000 51.9% $128,450,000 13.2% -22.7% 
  $0.80 1,147,200,000 $917,780,000 $471,610,000 51.4% $94,250,000 7.9% -16.7% 
  $0.90 1,101,000,000 $990,930,000 $517,900,000 52.3% $47,960,000 3.5% -8.5% 
  $1.00 1,063,400,000 $1,063,400,000 $565,860,000 53.2% --- --- --- 
  $1.10 1,033,100,000 $1,136,400,000 $616,580,000 54.3% $50,720,000 -2.8% 9.0% 
  $1.20 1,020,100,000 $1,224,100,000 $652,460,000 53.3% $86,600,000 -4.1% 15.3% 
  $1.30 1,009,000,000 $1,311,600,000 $687,400,000 52.4% $121,540,000 -5.1% 21.5% 
  $1.40 1,018,900,000 $1,426,400,000 $707,880,000 49.6% $142,020,000 -4.2% 25.1% 
85 
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The Monte Carlo simulation also allows the ability to look at the analysis in 
terms of profit elasticities.  According to the model, a 1% increase in the nominal price 
of a ticket would lead to an estimated profit increase of either 0.76% (under conservative 
rollovers) or 0.96% (under generous rollovers).  The computation of these values is 
provided in TABLE 4.3.  There is quite a large contrast when comparing these 
elasticities to those estimated under the static model outlined in Section 2.  The static 
model elasticity estimates are also reported in table.  While the profit elasticity under the 
dynamic model is straight forward to calculate, the profit elasticities reported for the 
static models of Section 2 need to be derived from their respective estimated price 
elasticities.  TABLE 4.4 reports the effective-price and profit elasticities for each of the 
static models discussed in Section 2 as well as the profit elasticities obtained from the 
dynamic model. 
The price elasticity obtained under the effective price defined by expression [2.1] 
(see Section 2) is given by 
 
%
%P EV
Q
P EV
 


 
. [4.2] 
Under this effective price definition, one cannot include the observations with super-
unitary observations into the log-log EPM.  The percentage change in profit as a function 
of ticket sales (Q) and the average profit per ticket (A = P – EV) is given by 
% % % ( )Q P EV      . [4.3] 
Substitution of [4.2] into [4.3] yields the profit elasticity equation, under an effective 
price of P – EV, or 
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TABLE 4.3. Profit Elasticities under the Dynamic Model 
 
METHOD 1 - (Conservative rollovers) 
  
Nominal 
Price Tickets Sold Revenue Profit Δ in Profit 
%Δ in 
Profit 
  $1.00 1,039,100,000 $1,039,100,000 $664,800,000 --- --- 
  $1.01 1,034,600,000 $1,045,000,000 $669,820,000 $5,020,000 0.76% 
         
METHOD 2 - (Generous rollovers) 
  
Nominal 
Price Tickets Sold Revenue Profit Δ in Profit 
%Δ in 
Profit 
  $1.00 1,063,400,000 $1,063,400,000 $565,860,000 --- --- 
  $1.01 1,058,800,000 $1,069,400,000 $571,290,000 $5,430,000 0.96% 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.4. Effective-Price and Profit Elasticity Comparison: 
 Static vs. Dynamic Models 
 
Model Price Elasticity (η) %Δ Profit 
Log-log (p = P - EV)   
 Omitted -0.166 1.46% 
Censored -0.145 1.72% 
Unrestricted --- --- 
Log-log (p = P/EV)     
Omitted -1.201 0.54% 
Censored -1.403 0.61% 
Unrestricted -1.302 0.97% 
Semi-log (p = P - EV)   
 Omitted -0.239 1.33% 
Censored -0.331 1.35% 
Unrestricted -0.249 1.71% 
LOWESS     
p = P-EV -0.205 1.56% 
Dynamic     
Conservative rollovers --- 0.76% 
Generous rollovers --- 0.96% 
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In order to determine the profit elasticity, it is necessary to evaluate expected 
value at the sample mean.  The sales-weighted mean expected values (      ) under the 
three samples: (1) omitted observations, (2) censored observations, and (3) unrestricted 
observations are 0.427, 0.503, and 0.560, respectively.  According to the log-log 
specification with a defined effective price of $1-EV, the estimated price elasticities are 
       -0.166 and          -0.145, which imply that a 1% increase in the price of a 
ticket will result in a profit increase of 1.41% and 1.57%, respectively.  According to the 
semi-log specification with the same effective price definition, the estimated price 
elasticities are        -0.239,          -0.331, and           -0.249, which imply 
that a 1% increase in the price of a ticket will result in a profit increase of 1.33%, 1.35%, 
and 1.71%, respectively.  Finally under the LOWESS model, the sales-weighted mean 
arc-elasticity is          -0.205, which implies a profit elasticity of 1.56. 
 Converting the price elasticities obtained from the log-log model under the 
effective price definition p = P/EV, requires a different procedure.  The price elasticity is 
given by 
 /
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P EV




, [4.5] 
where q = Q*EV.  Algebraically rewriting [4.5] reveals the following expression: 
/
% %
% %P EV
Q EV
P EV

  

  
. [4.6] 
A change the effective price of a ticket would lead to a change in the total expected sales 
for a given drawing, which would in-turn affect the magnitude of the expected value, 
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which again would change the effective price, and so on.  To address this issue, I 
simulate this iterative effect at a number of different points along the demand curve and 
find that the effect of the price change on EV under the first iteration is so small that it 
makes absolutely no impact whatsoever and can be ignored entirely.  Thus the %ΔEV 
terms in expression [4.6] reduce to zero, resulting in 
/
%
%P EV
Q
P




. [4.7] 
Substituting expression [4.7] into [4.3] provides the profit elasticity equation under an 
effective price of P/EV, or 
   % % %P P EV       . [4.8] 
Therefore, given the same sales-weighted mean expected values and price elasticities 
under the three sampling cases, or        -1.201,          -1.403, and       -1.302, 
we obtain the respective profit elasticities of 0.54, 0.61 and 0.97. 
 Comparison of the dynamically estimated profit elasticities with the statically 
estimated profit elasticity groups reveals two interesting results.  First, the static EPM 
under an effective price of P–EV tends to overestimate the change in profit.  Second, the 
static EPM under an effective price of P/EV tends to underestimate the change in profit.  
This inconsistency, coupled with the inconsistency of the elasticity estimates over the 
three sample cases is likely best explained by the fact that the static model relies entirely 
upon mean-valued estimates, while the values estimated under the dynamic model take 
all observations into account. 
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Finally, in order to examine the intertemporal effects that rollover-induced 
changes in the effective price have on the distribution of jackpots, I compare the 
distributions of a subsample of the total number of simulated jackpot values under prices 
of $0.70, $1.00, and $1.40.  Again, the impact of changes in the effective price, which 
affect the realization of sales, which in-turn impacts the probability of reaching higher, 
more-costly jackpots cannot be modeled in a static framework.  For each trial of 416 
draw periods, 54 jackpots were randomly selected with replacement resulting in three 
subsamples of 27,000 observations corresponding to each of the nominal price policies.  
A histogram of these subsampled (Poltis, Romano, and Wolf 1999) jackpot 
values for each of the three policies are provided in FIGURE 4.3.  As predicted, higher 
effective prices lead to fewer sales, resulting in more frequent realizations of larger 
jackpots since the probability the jackpot gets rolled over increases.  According to the  
three histograms, we observe a greater number of jackpots in the low-jackpot ranges (i.e. 
$4 million to $33 million) under the nominal price policy of $0.70.  Under a nominal 
price of $0.70, all effective prices are thus comparatively lower than those realized under 
the other two nominal price policies.  Similarly, under a nominal price $1.40 (with 
comparatively higher overall effective prices) we observe a greater number of jackpots 
occurring in the high-jackpot ranges (i.e. $73 million to $133 million).  These 
distributions were compared statistically, in pairs, using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
(Wilcoxon 1945).  The null hypothesis is that the median difference between each pair of 
observations is zero.  The p-values for each of the three tests (i.e. $0.70 vs. $1.00; $0.70 
vs. $1.40; and $1.00 vs. $1.40) were all 0.000, which leads to the rejection of the null 
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hypothesis. This result provides additional evidence to support the need for dynamic 
modeling framework for lottery profit analysis. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.3. Distribution of Simulated Jackpot Frequency under Three Different Nominal Prices 
 
 
4.5  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides compelling evidence to support the need for a dynamic 
framework for the analysis of a lottery controller’s profit stream.   The traditional static 
approach provides a convenient, though limited interpretation of estimated lottery price 
elasticities.  First the relationship between price and quantity cannot be meaningfully 
summarized using a single elasticity in the face of such a large degree of variation in the 
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effective price.  Furthermore, evaluating the static optimization conditions at every 
realized effective price still does not incorporate the intertemporal costs of a game 
moving to the next period via a rollover.  To address this issue, the implications of the 
lottery’s price on total profit are obtained through a Monte Carlo integration procedure.  
Results of the simulation under hypothetical changes in Lotto Texas’ nominal price 
indicate that total profit can be raised by increasing the nominal price. 
  More specifically, a $0.40 increase in the nominal price of a Lotto Texas ticket 
would lead to an estimated increase in profit in the range of $142 million to $191 million 
over the course of four years.  Since the simulated model does not take into 
consideration variable costs associated with operating a state-wide lottery game as well 
as potential substitution effects associated with a general price increase, these estimates 
provide a reasonable upper bound on the potential profit increase.  With lotto games 
operating in similar fashion throughout the world, the methods and implications of this 
study can easily be extended to suit these other games as well. 
 This paper provides a significant contribution to the existing literature on lottery 
demand by providing a new perspective on how to analyze the pricing of lottery games. 
Topics for future research include the extension of the dynamic model across a portfolio 
of games operated simultaneously within a state.  This situation also suggests a natural 
extension to the analysis discussed in Section 3, which provided evidence to suggest that 
competing games within a portfolio experience substantial substitution effects.  
Exploring how variation in the effective prices of the games impacts consumer 
purchasing behavior in a dynamic framework appears to be the next logical step.   
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5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this dissertation, I have discussed in detail the work of three different, yet 
closely related studies on the demand and optimal pricing of state lotteries.  This topic is 
particularly enlightening due to the recent trends showing increased reliance of state 
governments upon lottery financing as an alternative source for funding public 
programs.  This body of work provides a notable contribution to the economic literature 
on lottery demand and profitability analysis, aiming to not only improve upon current 
methods for estimating the demand for lottery tickets, but also to develop new methods 
that can provide better insight into how best to adjust a game’s structure in order to 
increase its profit stream. 
In Section 2, I addressed and resolved three outstanding issues in the literature on 
lottery demand.  First, I demonstrated how to incorporate observations with super-
unitary expected values into the effect price model through the use of two alternative 
modeling strategies: (1) estimating a semi-log regression model and (2) redefining the 
effective price.  By modeling demand from the perspective of consumer who purchases 
chances to win a dollar, I am able to include all available data into a log-log model 
without the need to censor or omit observations.  Second, I introduce a new method for 
addressing the endogeneity of the effective, which takes advantage of publicly available 
sales prediction data, effectively eliminating the need to run a two-stage regression 
model.  Third, I challenge the idea of using a mean-evaluated price elasticity measure to 
describe price sensitivity along the entire demand cure.  Since the effective price exhibits 
  
94 
such a high degree of variation over time, a single elasticity may obscure the natural 
curvature of the demand relationship.  Ultimately, I conclude that the empirical results 
indicate that according to the Lotto Texas data, the bias induced by censoring extreme 
observations is greater than that of failing to control for endogeneity by a factor of six.  
Furthermore, using a log-log functional form for the demand relationship imposes 
excessive restrictions on its curvature, specifically iso-elasticity.  By using a non-
parametric local-linear regression approach, which does not impose a specific functional 
form, I show that estimates of demand elasticity actually vary along the demand curve.  
This finding suggests that simply looking at the mean provides too little information 
about the price sensitivity of demand among jackpots of different size. 
In Section 3, I extend this analysis by developing a model to fit an entire 
portfolio of lottery games.  Since states typically operates multiple games 
simultaneously, it is reasonable to suspect that a portfolios games could likely compete 
with one another for a player’s dollar.   Using Barten’s synthetic demand system and 
incorporating modeling innovations introduced in Section 2, I estimate cross-price 
effects of portfolio of Texas lottery games and examine whether the games are 
individually priced scheme optimize profits over the whole portfolio.  The results 
provide strong evidence that games within Texas’ portfolio are largely substitutes of one 
another.  Evaluating the profit maximization problem of the Texas Lottery reveals 
evidence that the games are not priced to maximize total portfolio profits. 
In Section 4, I argue that profitability analysis of lottery games with rolling 
jackpots is better suited under a dynamic framework, which takes into account the 
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intertemporal costs of being forced to postpone paying the jackpot in the event a rollover 
is triggered.  To address this issue, the implications of the lottery’s price on total profit 
are obtained through a Monte Carlo integration procedure.  Results of the simulation 
under hypothetical changes in Lotto Texas’ nominal price indicate that total profit can be 
raised by increasing the nominal price.  More specifically, a $0.40 increase in the 
nominal price of a Lotto Texas ticket would lead to an estimated increase in profit in the 
range of $142 million to $191 million over the course of four years.  Comparison of the 
profit elasticity under the dynamic model with those estimated using the static EPM 
reveals that the static EPM using an effective price of P–EV overestimates the profit 
elasticity, while the static EPM using an effective price of P/EV underestimates the 
profit elasticity.  Furthermore examination of the jackpot distribution under various 
nominal prices provides evidence to support the need to model profitability in dynamic 
framework.  Increasing the price of a ticket will lead to fewer sales, which increases the 
likelihood of reaching higher jackpots.  This effect cannot be controlled for in the static 
framework.    
The methods outlined in the previous sections do exhibit a few limitations that 
motivate the need for future work on this topic.  First, the effective price model heavily 
upon the first moment of the payout distribution.  It is possible that higher-order 
moments could play a significant part in the behavioral demand response to the relative 
differences in the period-by-period states of a lottery game.  Incorporating the risk level 
of a bet beyond its expected value could help explain observable differences between 
games operated at different scales and with widely differing rules.  Second, lottery 
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operating states to engage in marketing and advertising to promote their games.  Costs 
related to advertising and promotions were not explicitly model in this framework and 
thus could have some effect on the prediction made in the analysis.  Third, including the 
sale of scratch-off (instant win) tickets into the analysis could have a significant impact 
on the estimation results. Sales of these tickets make up the largest share of revenue for 
the Texas Lottery.  However, including these tickets into the model poses a significant 
challenge from an econometric perspective due to their short lifespan and lack of price 
variation over time. Another important topic for future research would entail the 
expansion of a Monte Carlo procedure to explore how profit streams are affected by 
policies other than a simple nominal price change, including changes in a game’s odds, 
the distribution of lower-tier prizes, or even the potential of imposing a policy of 
nominally pricing in relation to the size of the jackpot.  There is still much that we do not 
understand about the nature of inherently risky goods and further study on this topic may 
be able to provide important insight into other risk markets such as insurance or financial 
asset pricing as well.  
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